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In its 1963 landmark ruling, Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme
Court required prosecutors to disclose to the defense information favorable to
the defendant about guilt or punishment.1 Sadly, prosecutors all over the country
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1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “that the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution.”). For an analysis on how the Court’s Brady decision has been interpreted, see
Laurie L. Levenson, Discovery from the Trenches: The Future of Brady, 60 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 74, 77 (2013) (“A Brady violation occurs when (1) evidence is favorable to the accused
because it is exculpatory or impeaches a government witness; (2) the prosecution fails to disclose
such evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) the defendant is prejudiced because the
undisclosed evidence is material.”).
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struggle to fulfill their Brady obligation to provide the defense with exculpatory
and impeachment evidence before trial.2
Prosecutorial misconduct is an incredibly serious problem within the criminal
justice system. When prosecutors fail to comply with Brady, the costs are
enormous. Lives of the accused can be ruined by wrongful convictions.3
Victims may suffer as past wounds are reopened and confidence in justice is
lost.4 Taxpayers bear the financial burdens of appeals, post-trial litigation, and
re-trials.5 This threatens respect for prosecutors and the criminal justice system
as a whole.6
Brady violations have been identified as one of the main causes of wrongful
convictions in the United States.7 Since 1989, nearly 1,100 people have been
exonerated after it was found that the prosecution had engaged in misconduct.8

2. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 790 F.3d 550, 563 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 898–902 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705, 708 (6th
Cir. 2013); United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2012); Goudy v. Basinger, 604
F.3d 394, 401–02 (7th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 660–62 (3d Cir. 2009); Mahler
v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 503–04 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1, 8 (1st
Cir. 2008); Trammell v. McKune, 485 F.3d 546, 551–52 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Stevens,
No. 08-CR-231 EGS, 2009 WL 6525926, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009).
3. Since 1989, there have been 1,089 exonerations for official misconduct, 11,565 years total
lost, and 10.5 average years lost per exoneration. See Interactive Data Display, THE NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerat
ions-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2017) [hereinafter “Interactive Data
Display”] (including eleven cases of posthumous exoneration). Official misconduct is defined as
“[p]olice, prosecutors, or other government officials significantly abused their authority or the
judicial process in a manner that contributed to the exoneree’s conviction.” Glossary, THE NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (last visited Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx; see also Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s
Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the System That Protects Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-misconductneworleans-louisiana_n_35
29891.html (“Between 1973 and 2002, Orleans Parish prosecutors sent 36 people to death row.
Nine of those convictions were later overturned due to Brady violations. Four of those later resulted
in exonerations.”). For information about all exonerations, see Interactive Data Display, supra note
3 (indicating that since 1989, there were 2,130 exonerations, 18,590 total years lost, and 8.7 average
years lost per exoneration).
4. See generally Balko, supra note 3 (using the story of an exoneree-turned-activist to argue
that Brady violations are the product of a broken criminal justice system unable to be self-corrected
in large part because prosecutors who enjoy high level of protection from the fallout of their Brady
violations and the attorneys who would be pursuing action against the prosecutors are naturally
reluctant to hold their own colleagues to account).
5. See Levenson, supra note 1, at 74 n. 52 (noting that wrongful convictions from 1989 to
2011 in Illinois cost taxpayers approximately $214 million).
6. See Balko, supra note 3.
7. New Report: Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.innocenceproject.org/new-report-prosecutorial-misconduct-andwrongful-convictions/ [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT].
8. See Interactive Data Display, supra note 3; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Part 1:
The Verdict: Dishonor, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 10, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
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Brady violations are the most common form of prosecutorial misconduct cited
by courts when overturning convictions.9 According to legal scholar Cynthia E.
Jones, the right to have exculpatory information turned over by the government
is “one of the most unenforced constitutional mandates in the criminal justice
system.”10
The withholding of exculpatory and impeaching information is a topic
national discussion. A 2015 article by Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
Alex Kozinski11 has reverberated throughout the legal community. In a
dissenting opinion preceding his article, Judge Kozinski observed that there is
an “epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land.”12 United States
Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys responded to Judge Kozinski, denying
that Brady violations by federal prosecutors were common and asserting that
DOJ attorneys receive adequate training to not only avert Brady violations, but
also do more than what Brady requires.13 Judge Kozinski is not alone in his
observations. United States District for the District of Columbia Judge Emmet
Sullivan has been outspoken about Brady violations as well, even participating
in a committee to draft a rule outlining the disclosure obligations of D.C.
prosecutors.14 Scholars recently highlighted the too frequent problem of
prosecutors in this country suppressing exculpatory information.15
As part of the DOJ, the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) is the top
prosecutors’ office in the country.16 Few prosecutors’ offices are as revered as
watchdog/chi-020103trial1-story.html (sixty-seven death row inmates have granted new trials due
to Brady violations).
9. See Balko, supra note 3; see also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PRELIMINARY MATERIALS,
IN PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017) [hereinafter
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT] (“A prosecutor’s violation of the obligation to disclose favorable
evidence accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other type of malpractice, but is rarely
sanctioned by courts, and almost never by disciplinary bodies.”).
10. Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of
Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 434 (2010).
11. Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC iii, viii
(2015).
12. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
13. Letter from Andrew D. Goldsmith, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. & Nat’l. Crim. Discovery
Coordinator, Off. of the Deputy Att’y Gen., & John F. Walsh, Chair, Att’y Gen.’s Advisory Comm.,
to the Geo. L.J. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/11/DOJ-Response-toKozinski.pdf.
14. See Zoe Tillman, D.C. Judges Weigh Rule to Curb Prosecutor Misconduct, THE NAT. L.J.
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202748711837/DC-Judges-Weigh-Ruleto-Curb-Prosecutor-Misconduct?slreturn=20160516221225.
15. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Battey, Note, A Chink in the Armor? The Prosecutorial Immunity
Split in the Seventh Circuit in Light of Whitlock, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 553, 562 (2014),
https://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2014/2/Battey.pdf (“While Brady
creates a constitutional right to exculpatory evidence, given the development of the doctrine in the
Supreme Court, it is unclear when this right vests, and to what evidence.”).
16. See generally Office of the United States Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usao/about-offices-united-states-attorneys (“The United States Attorney is
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the USAO.17 The prosecutors from the USAO come from top schools18 and
often forgo lucrative private sector jobs to become civil servants.19 Despite the
national prominence of the DOJ and the USAO, the USAO made headlines for
a number of Brady violations in the last decade: the Senator Ted Stevens case,20
the Chandra Levy case,21 and several other cases22 have put the USAO in the
news.23
Responding to criticism of the USAO following the Stevens case, in 2009,
then Attorney General Eric Holder said, “I am committed to ensuring that our
prosecutors are provided sufficient training to understand fully their discovery
obligations, and that they receive the support and resources necessary to do their
jobs in a manner consistent with the proud traditions of this Department.” 24 The
following Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, had little opportunity for Brady
the chief federal law enforcement officer in their district and is also involved in civil litigation
where the United States is a party.”).
17. See, e.g., Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors’ Conduct Can Tip Justice Scales,
USA
TODAY
(Sept.
23,
2010,
1:31
PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-09-22-federal-prosecutorsreform_N.htm?csp=usat.me (“USA TODAY documented 201 criminal cases in the years that
followed in which judges determined that Justice Department prosecutors — the nation’s most elite
and powerful law enforcement officials — themselves violated laws or ethics rules.”); Erin Fuchs,
America’s ‘Killer Elite’ Lawyers Are All in One Prosecutor’s Office in Manhattan, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-southern-district-of-new-yorkis-so-prestigious-2013-11 (“The most prestigious law gig in the U.S. may be the U.S. attorney’s
office in Manhattan.”).
18. See, e.g., Elise Baranouski, Joan Ruttenberg & Carolyn Stafford Stein, The Fast Track to
a U.S. Attorney’s Office, BERNARD KOTEEN OFF. OF PUB. INT. ADVISING HARV. L. SCH. (2014),
http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2008/06/fast-track-final.pdf; Graduates Share Advice on
Careers in U.S. Attorney’s Office, COLUM. L. SCH. (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.law.columbi
a.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2014/november2014/US-attorney (“Four Columbia Law
School alumni currently working in the civil and criminal divisions of the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Southern District of New York.”).
19. Graduates Share Advice, supra note 18 (discussing two students who left law firm jobs
for the U.S. Attorney’s Office).
20. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-CR-231 EGS, 2009 WL 6525926, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 7,
2009).
21. David Benowitz, What The Chandra Levy Retrial Teaches Us About Defendants’ Rights,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-benowitz/what-thechandra-levy-ret_b_10146094.html.
22. Andrew King-Ries & Beth Brennan, A Fall from Grace: United States v. W.R. Grace and
the Need for Criminal Discovery Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 313, 316 (2010).
23. See, e.g., Nedra Pickler, Justice Dept. Lawyers in Contempt for Withholding Stevens
Documents, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2009) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artic
le/2009/02/13/AR2009021303092.html (reporting on how Judge Emmet G. Sullivan held all three
DOJ lawyers in contempt for not producing the documents by the deadline when the lawyers
admitted to him that they had no reason to withhold the documents).
24. Attorney General Announces Increased Training, Review of Process for Providing
Materials to Defense in Criminal Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 14, 2009), https://www.just
ice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-increased-training-review-process-providing-material
s-defense.
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reform in her brief tenure.25 Questions loom about Jefferson “Jeff” Sessions’
ability to lead the DOJ away from more Brady trouble in light of the Brady
scandals in his career as a prosecutor prior to his decades as a United States
Senator.26
During his career as Attorney General of Alabama, courts repeatedly
concluded that Sessions violated Brady.27 Furthermore, in 1996, a judge called
a Brady violation by Sessions’ office the worst he had ever seen and dismissed
the case.28 Despite this extraordinary step, no appeal was taken by the office.29
The New York Times editorial board called on the “feds” to “stop bad
prosecutors” by pointing out that the DOJ is in a unique position to monitor
prosecutors.30 With prosecutors immune from civil suits and rarely facing any
ethics sanctions,31 there is little to stop federal prosecutors from hiding Brady

25. See Loretta Lynch Fast Facts, CNN (July 4, 2017) http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/1
9/us/loretta-lynch-fast-facts/index.html (stating that former Attorney General Lynch only served
from April 2015 to January 2017).
26. Drew Griffin, Scott Glover & Nelli Black, Jeff Sessions’ Office Accused of Prosecutorial
Misconduct in the ‘90s, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/poli
tics/jeff-sessions-prosecutorial-misconduct.
27. Shields v. Alabama, 680 So. 2d 969, 975 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (holding the prosecution
violated Brady when it learned about but failed to disclose to the defendant a murder victim’s prior
assault conviction in which the murder victim attacked someone in a drunken rage when the
defendant was arguing that the victim was trying to kill him in a drunken rage); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 677 So. 2d 1254, 1260–61 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding the prosecution violated
Brady during a capital murder trial when it failed to disclose the plea agreement of a key witness
who then went on to commit perjury).
28. Drew Griffin, Scott Glover & Nelli Black, Jeff Sessions’ Office Accused of Prosecutorial
Misconduct in the ‘90s, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/
jeff-sessions-prosecutorial-misconduct/.
29. Id.
30. Editorial, To Stop Bad Prosecutors, Call the Feds, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/opinion/to-stop-bad-prosecutors-call-the-feds.html?_r=0.
31. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (finding prosecutors immune from
suits involving the violation of constitutional rights, but explaining such immunity is in the public
interest); see e.g., Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 535 (2011)
The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity in federal civil rights actions is
unsupportable. From the point of view of public policy, absolute prosecutorial immunity
leads to wrongful prosecutions and convictions, ruins the lives of the wrongly accused,
subjects crime victims to the painful and protracted relitigation of their experiences,
impairs public safety, wastes public resources, and undermines public respect for, and
confidence in, the criminal justice system. Moreover, absolute prosecutorial immunity
is historically unjustified. Section 1983 was adopted to provide a federal civil rights
remedy against Southern prosecutors who were using criminal prosecutions to deny
newly freed slaves their civil rights, and to punish and deter Union officers and officials
from enforcing those civil rights. It was not intended to shield prosecutors from liability;
on the contrary, it was intended to subject them to liability. And finally, the doctrine
generates conflicts and confusion that complicate and prolong civil rights actions for
prosecutorial misconduct.”
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and trying to win at all costs.32 While DOJ’s Civil Rights Division spent
considerable efforts documenting troubling problems within local police
departments33 at the local level, efforts by DOJ to police itself are at the very
least, opaque under the eras of Lynch and Holder.34
This Article addresses the DOJ’s historic opposition to reform and the
problems that stem from a lack of interest in reform. The USAO handles federal
crimes and local crimes in the District of Columbia.35 Because of the District of
Columbia’s uniqueness as a city without a state, the USAO prosecutes most of
the crime there rather than the local District Attorney’s Office. The USAO for
the District of Columbia is the largest USAO, so that it can accommodate the
heavy caseload of both state and federal criminal cases. This Article focuses in
part specifically on the USAO for DC. It will show that the USAO record with
respect to Brady has not been what it should be and will illustrate the many
Brady violations revealed since 2000. This Article will be the first to show that
the USAO violates Brady multiple times a year. In addition, this Article will
show the numerous efforts at blocking Brady reform by the DOJ. The Article
will then survey the Brady violations under Sessions’ time as a prosecutor and
evaluate the likelihood for significant reform while he is the Attorney General
for the United States. Finally, this Article will suggest for Brady reform for
courts and other institutional players.

George A. Weiss, Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson, 60 DRAKE L. REV.
199, 233 (2011) (“Notably, the only official receiving absolute immunity who is not neutral to the
justice process–such as a witness, judge, or legislator–but acts in an argumentative and adversarial
role is the prosecutor.”); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Damages for Innocent Man who
Spent 14 Years on Death Row, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/
mar/30/nation/la-na-court-prosecutors-20110330 (reporting how the Supreme Court overturned a
jury verdict that had awarded $14 million to an innocent man who sat on death row for fourteen
years because it considered the man’s case to be one incident rather than part of a pattern of
conduct).
32. See e.g., Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must
Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 9–18 (2009) (arguing that
politics, whether it be from the election of state prosecutors or the appointment of federal
prosecutors,
creates a “win-at-all-costs” mentality that perversely incentivizes prosecutors to seek as many
convictions as possible rather than justice); Adam Foss, A Prosecutor’s Vision for a Better Justice
System, TED (Feb. 2016), https://www.ted.com/talks/adam_foss_a_prosecutor_s_vision_for_a_
better_justice_system?language=en (“[Prosecutors a]re judged internally and externally by [their]
convictions and [their] trial wins.”).
33. Editorial, Consent Decrees, Racial Bias, and Policing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/us/heres-how-racial-bias-plays-out-in-policing.html.
34. See Brink, supra note 32, at 21–22.
35. About Us, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. DIST. OF COLUM. (Feb 11, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/about-us (“[The United States Attorney’s Office for the District
of Columbia] is responsible not only for the prosecution of all federal crimes, but also for the
prosecution of all serious local crime committed by adults in the District of Columbia.”).
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I. BRADY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION
Except in some circumstances, criminal defendants generally do not have a
right to discovery in their federal criminal cases.36 They do, however, have a
right to be provided exculpatory material of which the government is aware.37
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “evidence favorable to an
accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment” must
be disclosed to the defense.38 That disclosure is a due process right.39 Because
of the unique role of the prosecutor in the U.S. criminal justice system, the
Supreme Court has said that the government must “assist the defense in making
its case.” 40 For the most part, criminal defendants and their attorneys have fewer
resources than prosecutors and police.41 Because of the Supreme Court’s
mandate and the limited resources of most indigent defendants and their public
defender,42 the defense relies on prosecutors to be the ministers of justice that
the Supreme Court has said that they must be.43
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
37. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 n.6 (1985).
41. See Lawrence F. Travis III & Bradley D. Edwards, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE
243–48 (Pamela Chester & Ellen S. Boyne eds., 2015) (stating that defense attorneys are typically
less established attorneys, solo practitioners, or attorneys from small offices who have to deal with
large caseloads); Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady
Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 175 (2012)
There is ample evidence that prosecutors and defense lawyers (especially courtappointed lawyers) are not equals. While defense lawyers are expected to investigate
and the failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, this constitutional
rule does not—nor could it legitimately—reflect any assumption that defense lawyers
have equal capacity to conduct an investigation as compared to the average prosecutor.”).
42. See, e.g., Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1095 (2016) (“These defendants, rendered
indigent, would fall back upon publicly paid counsel, including overworked and underpaid public
defenders.”); Weisburd, supra note 43, at 176.
[I]ndigent criminal defendants are at a severe disadvantage. . . . [T]he provision of
indigent defense in this country is in crisis. State and local public defender offices are
underfunded. Individual public defenders often handle over one hundred cases at a time,
often with little or no investigative support. Because of the funding crisis, courtappointed lawyers often provide representation that violates their professional duties. As
a result, most court-appointed defense lawyers lack the investigative resources to
discover Brady material after trial, much less before trial even begins. The investigative
resources at the disposal of an average prosecutor always outmatch those available to an
average public defender or appointed lawyer.
43. See, e.g., Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1095 (citing Census of Public Defender Offices, 2007:
County-based and Local Public Defender Offices, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, 10 (Sept. 2010)) (“As the Department of Justice explains, only 27 percent of countybased public defender offices have sufficient attorneys to meet nationally recommended caseload
standards.”); Matt Ford, A Near-Epiphany at the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/a-near-epiphany-at-the-supreme-court/47603
7/.
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Giglio v. United States extended that obligation not just to exculpatory
evidence, but also to impeachment evidence.44 Much of the evidence that the
government fails to turn over is impeachment evidence—information that
undermines the credibility of the government witness.45 Impeachment evidence
is a broad category.46 Plea agreements,47 prior convictions,48 inconsistent

Underfunding and understaffing in state public-defender systems weakens the quality of
legal representation they can provide to clients. Virtually all of Kentucky’s public
defenders exceeded the American Bar Association’s recommended caseload in 2015.
Minnesota’s public defenders took on almost double the ABA standard in 2010—
170,000 cases for fewer than 400 lawyers—and spent only an average of 12 minutes on
each case outside the courtroom. Some states face even greater crises. In cash-strapped
Louisiana, where 8 out of 10 defendants cannot afford a lawyer, the system is on the
verge of collapse.
44. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“When the reliability of a given witness
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility
falls within this general rule.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness
and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon
such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life
or liberty may depend.”).
46. See Jones, supra note 10, at 415, 425–26 (2010).
Impeachment evidence includes any information regarding a witness’s prior convictions,
biases, prejudices, self-interests, or any motive to fabricate or curry favor with the
government. Impeachment evidence also consists of prior inconsistent statements of the
witness and any prior failure of the witness to identify the defendant. The government
must also disclose information that casts doubt on the ability of the witness to accurately
perceive, recall, or report the facts related to the witness’s testimony, including mental
instability, substance abuse, memory loss, or any other physical or mental impairment.
In addition, Brady impeachment evidence includes any positive or negative inducements
used to motivate a witness to testify on behalf of the government.
(internal citations omitted).
47. Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a Brady violation when
the prosecution failed to disclose that the one witness who placed the defendant at the scene of the
murder had taken a plea deal); see, e.g., Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
prosecution’s secret deal with [its main witness] was material to Silva’s conviction for murder, and
the State violated Silva’s due process rights by failing to disclose the deal to the defense.”); Monroe
v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 315–17 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding a Brady violation, in part, because the
prosecution failed to disclose that their key witness had taken a plea deal); United States v. Sterba,
22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334–40 (M.D. Fla. 1998). Following a mistrial due to prosecutorial
misconduct, defendant’s motion for dismissal was granted. Id. at 1339. Among the impeachment
material that the government failed to disclose was a prior guilty plea for filing a false police report
in a case that led to the arrest of an innocent man. Id. at 1338. This was impeachment material that
should have been disclosed to the defense before trial because it signaled “severe credibility
problems” of the government’s main witness. See id.
48. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 660–62 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding a Brady violation
in part because the prosecution failed to disclose that a key witness was a mentally ill man who was
obsessed with being a law enforcement official and had been previously convicted of impersonating
a police officer); Lewis v. United States 408 A.2d 303, 310–12 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding a Brady
violation when federal prosecutors failed to disclose to the defense the FBI “rap sheets” of one of
the prosecution’s witnesses).
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accounts,49 promises of reward money,50 and other information51 that might
diminish the weight of the witness’s testimony all fall into the category of
impeachment material.
The Court made clear that Brady extends to anyone involved in the
investigation of the case.52 Thus, Brady’s requirements do not simply apply to
what the prosecutor chooses to learn.53 Although sometimes the police, rather
than the prosecutor, possesses the exculpatory information, the prosecutor
nevertheless has a duty to learn of Brady information.54 Prosecutors cannot stick
their heads in the sand as they prepare their cases.55
49. See, e.g., Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 503–04 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding a Brady
violation in a murder trial when the prosecution failed to disclose a witness’ pre-trial statements
that were inconsistent with the witness’ testimony at trial even though the witness’ testimony was
the only tying the defendant to the murder); see also Monroe, 323 F.3d at 315–17 (finding a Brady
violation in part because the prosecution failed to disclose to the defense a key witness’ inconsistent
statements). But see United States v. Jones, 609 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. Mass. 2009)
[The government’s main witness’s] important inconsistent statements were not disclosed
to Jones until the court conducted an in camera review of [the prosecution’s] notes, just
before the suppression hearing was complete . . . Because [the government’s main
witness’s] prior inconsistent statements were ultimately disclosed in time for his false
testimony to be discredited, Jones has not been deprived of due process or otherwise
prejudiced by the government’s misconduct.
50. See, e.g., Paula Reed Ward, Court Agrees to New Trial in 1995 Fire that Killed Three
Firefighters, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/ci
ty/2015/03/21/Court-agrees-to-new-trial-in-1995-fire-that-killed-three-firefighters/stories/201503
210093.
Gregory Brown, 37, had his original conviction overturned by Common Pleas Judge
Joseph K. Williams III, who found that the prosecution withheld impeachment evidence
from Brown’s defense concerning two critical witnesses who were promised reward
money for their testimony. The Allegheny County District Attorney’s office appealed
that decision on three grounds, and on Friday, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued a
2-1 decision in Brown’s favor, finding that he was “thwarted by the commonwealth’s
repeated denials that a reward had even been paid.”
51. See, e.g., Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a Brady violation
in a capital murder and abduction case because the prosecution failed to disclose witness statements
that cast doubt on whether an abduction occurred and evidence of the victim’s intoxication that
would have mitigated the aggravating factors justifying capital punishment); Benn v. Lambert, 283
F.3d 1040, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (“There was no evidence at trial to impeach [the government’s
main witness’s] competence or his ability to recollect or perceive the events. Thus, evidence of his
drug use would have provided the defense with a new and different ground of impeachment.”);
Boyette v. Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a Brady violation because a fire
marshal’s undisclosed report cast doubt on the government’s main witness’s ability to correctly
identify the defendant).
52. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Court said that:
[U]nless . . . the adversary system of prosecution is to descend to a gladiatorial level
unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth, the government simply
cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the suppression of evidence has come to
portend such an effect on a trial’s outcome as to destroy confidence in its result.
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The constitutional mandates and the Supreme Court’s interpretations of Brady
are not the only rules that prosecutors must follow.56 Ethical rules particular to
prosecutors require them to “seek justice.” 57 Indeed, the American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Rule 3.858 and most state ethical rules require
prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence.59 The Supreme Court has said:
=xt
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just one.60
=xt
Unfortunately, few prosecution offices have remained immune to Brady
errors.61 Prosecution offices all over the country have been found to have
Id. at 439.
56. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N 2009)
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pd
f.
57. Id.
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_8_special_
responsibilities_of_a_prosecutor.html.
59. Additionally, “[n]early half of the states require disclosure of evidence that is exculpatory
or tends to negate guilt or reduce punishment, without requiring that the evidence be material.”
Leonard Sosnov, Brady Reconstructed: An Overdue Expansion of Rights and Remedies, 45 N.M.
L. REV. 171, 223 n. 122 (2014) (citing ALASKA R. CRIM P. 16(b)(3); 16A ARIZ. R. CRIM. P.
15.1(b)(8); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(d); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(e) (West 2013); COLO. R. CRIM.
P. 16(a)(2); 4 CONN. PRAC., CRIM. P. § 40-11(a)(1); FLA. R. CRIM. P. R. 3.220(b)(4); HAW. R.
PENAL. P. 16(b)(1)(vii); IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(a) (West 2013); ILL. S. CT. R. 412(c); MD. RULES 4263(d)(5); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(iii); MICH. CT. R. 6.201(B)(1); MISS. URCCC 9.04
(A)(6); MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.03(A)(9); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-322 (West 2013); N.J. R. 3:133(b)(1); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 39.14(h) (West 2013); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(4); VT.
R. CRIM. P. 16(b)–(c); WASH. SUPER. CT. CR. R. 4.7 (a)(3); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(1)(h) (West
2013); State v. Castor, 599 N.W.2d 201, 211 (Neb. 1999)). North Carolina goes a step further and
“mandates disclosure of the entire file of the prosecutor and all investigative agencies.” Id. (citing
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (West 2013)).
60. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
61. See generally, David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After
Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-
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violated their Due Process obligations to provide exculpatory evidence to the
defense.62 In an egregious case, former New Orleans District Attorney Harry
Connick Sr.63 stated that he had not read a case since he was elected District
Attorney and admitted that he did not train his prosecutors on their Brady
obligations.64 Despite the immense costs when prosecutors fail to uphold their
due process obligations, consequences for prosecutors who withhold Brady are
relatively rare.65

myth-of-prosecutorial-accountability-after-connick-v-thompson-why-existing-professionalresponsibility-measures-cannot-protect-against-prosecutorial-misconduct (“The lack of any
external oversight of prosecutors’ offices creates an environment in which misconduct can go
undetected and undeterred.”).
62. See, e.g., Tony Saavedra & Kelly Puente, In Rare Move, Judge Kicks Orange County D.A.
off Case of Seal Beach Mass Shooting Killer Scott Dekraai, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Mar. 12,
2015), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/attorney-654000-county-case.html (“A Superior Court
judge removed the Orange County District Attorney’s Office from the case against the deadliest
killer in county history, saying . . . that the defendant’s right to a fair trial had been violated by false
testimony and the withholding of evidence.”); Denis Slattery, Bronx Prosecutor Bashed and Barred
from Courtroom for Misconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/
new-york/bronx/bronx-prosecutor-barred-courtroom-article-1.1746238 (reporting on a case in
which a judge banned a prosecutor barred from his courtroom because she failed to disclose Brady
evidence that proved a defendant’s innocence).
63. See Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and Supreme Court Justices About
Brady v. Maryland, 13 LOYOLA J. PUB. INT. L 518, 521 (2012) (describing Connick’s office as
having “one of the worst records in the United States for concealing exculpatory evidence from
defendants, and an office culture that was deliberately indifferent to the rights of defendants,
especially in training and supervising prosecutors on compliance with Brady”); see also Balko,
supra note 3 ([Therefore between 1973 and 2002,] “[eleven] percent of the men Connick’s office
attempted to send to their deaths — for which prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence in the
process — were later found to be factually innocent.”); John Hollway, Innocent on Death Row,
SLATE (Oct. 5 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/10/inn
ocent_on_death_row.html (“According to the Innocence Project, a national organization that
represents incarcerated criminals claiming innocence, 36 men convicted in Orleans Parish during
Connick’s 30-year tenure as DA have made allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and 19 have
had their sentences overturned or reduced as a result.”).
64. See Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and Supreme Court Justices About
Brady v. Maryland, 13 LOYOLA J. PUB. INT. L 518, 521 (2012) (quoting Connick v. Thompson,
131 S. Ct. 1350, 1379 (2011)) (“Prosecutors would go to Connick with Brady questions, but
Connick acknowledged that he ‘stopped reading law books . . . and looking at opinions’ when he
was elected District Attorney. Further, as Thompson’s expert testified, Connick’s supervision
regarding Brady was ‘the blind leading the blind.’”) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350,
1380 (2011)); see also Keenan, supra note 63, at 208 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct.
1350, 1380 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (“Shortly after Connick’s retirement, ‘a survey of
assistant district attorneys in the Office revealed that more than half felt they had not received the
training they needed to do their jobs.’”).
65. See Angela J. Davis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
123–77 (James Cook & Dedi Felman eds., 2007); Denis Slattery, Bronx Prosecutor Bashed and
Barred from Courtroom for Misconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-prosecutor-barred-courtroom-article-1.1746238 (containing a
link to the transcript from a hearing before Judge John Wilson in which he barred the prosecutor
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A. Brady in Practice
Far more exculpatory material is withheld than is documented in published
appellate opinions.66 Some Brady violations go undisclosed and entirely
unnoticed by the defense and the court.67 When a prosecutor suppresses
exculpatory information, the violation of Brady is by its very nature virtually
impossible for the defense to discover or prove.68 Prosecutors may dismiss
charges or make generous plea offers to avoid revealing the information prior to
trial.69 In other instances, once the prosecution discloses the information and the
defense files complaints or motions for sanctions over late disclosure,
prosecutors then dismiss criminal charges or make generous plea offers to
escape embarrassing litigation, thus avoiding written opinions that cast them in
a bad light.70
Some prosecutors may lack training or supervision to understand the extent
of their obligations. Prosecutors who willfully withhold evidence may know
that they violate the law by doing so, so they conceal their conduct.71 Because
prosecutors and police have “exclusive” access to the information and they are

from ever appearing before him again, however it is unclear if the prosecutor was reprimanded
internally); Balko, supra note 3
In the end, one of the most powerful positions in public service — a position that carries
with it the authority not only to ruin lives, but in many cases the power to end them — is
one of the positions most shielded from liability and accountability. And the freedom to
push ahead free of consequences has created a
zealous conviction culture.
Nedra Pickler, Justice Dept. Lawyers in Contempt for Withholding Stevens Documents, WASH.
POST (Feb. 14, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR20
09021303092.html (describing the noteworthy occurrence of a judge holding three DOJ lawyers in
contempt for not producing the documents by the deadline).
66. See Balko, supra note 3 (“Courts most commonly deal with misconduct by overturning
convictions. To get a new trial, however, a defendant must not only show evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct, but must also show that without that misconduct the jury likely would
have acquitted.”).
67. See id.
Emily Maw, director of the New Orleans Innocence Project, a group that advocates for
the wrongfully convicted, says violations in low-level cases are much less likely to come
to light. ‘It’s expensive to discover a Brady violation. They’re usually found after
conviction, with the help of investigators and attorneys poring through police reports and
prosecutors’ files.
68. Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J.
1450, 1455 n. 23 (2006) (citing Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective
Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. U.L. REV.
833).
69. Andrew P. O’Brien, Reconcilable Differences: The Supreme Court Should Allow the
Marriage of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 78 IND. L.J. 899, 907 (2003).
70. Id.
71. Keenan, supra note 63, at 209 (“[P]rosecutors who engage in willful misconduct
presumably do not want to be discovered and therefore take steps to conceal their misdeeds.”).
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ones who control when, what, if, and how Brady material is disclosed,72 it is
difficult for defense attorneys to know whether that material exists.73 In other
words, you do not know what you do not know. This control over information
by the government means that the defense does not learn of favorable material
in many instances. Oftentimes the defense only learns of exculpatory evidence
by accident.74
With over ninety-five percent of federal convictions obtained by a guilty
plea,75 it is easy for prosecutors to escape the chronicling of their Brady
violations.76 In United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that a defendant
cannot withdraw a guilty plea where the government has withheld impeachment
information.77 The Court wrote, “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of
course, forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional
guarantees” 78 and that “a constitutional obligation to provide impeachment
information during plea bargaining, prior to entry of a guilty plea, could
seriously interfere with the Government’s interest in securing those guilty pleas

72. See Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations:
Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2175
(2010) [hereinafter “Green I”] (“Claims about the frequency of disclosure error are hard to prove
or disprove, precisely because prosecutors have not systematically studied their mistakes. No one
else can do so, given that prosecutors ordinarily have exclusive access to information needed to
assess how and why—and often whether—disclosure errors occurred.”); see also Weisburd, supra
note 43, at 146 (explaining that the Supreme Court removed the requirement that the defense
request exculpatory evidence from the prosecution because the prosecution would know best
whether it had exculpatory evidence).
73. See Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing
Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 303, 306–07 (2010)
The prosecution’s Brady obligation is largely self-enforced: prosecutors determine what
is exculpatory and what must be turned over to the defense. As a result, lack of
compliance with the Brady rule will often go undetected, and it is fair to assume that
most Brady violations go undiscovered. . . . Brady violations often come to light during
trial or post-conviction, usually by way of re-investigation or fortuity. The type of fullscale re-investigation that is typically necessary to discover previously suppressed
exculpatory evidence post-conviction is rarely conducted. . . . Unfortunately, as a
consequence, the actual number of Brady violations remains unknown.
74. See Jones, supra note 10, at 433.
75. See Lindsey Devers, Plea and Charge Bargaining: Research Summary, BUREAU OF JUST.
ASSISTANCE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargain
ingResearchSummary.pdf.
76. See Keenan, supra note 63, at 210
[T]he vast majority of known instances of prosecutorial misconduct come to light only
during the course of a drawn-out trial or appellate proceeding. . . . But most criminal
cases in the United States result in plea bargains, which are rarely the subject of extensive
investigation or judicial review, creating a heightened risk of undetected prosecutorial
misconduct in the plea bargaining context.
77. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 624–25 (2002).
78. Id. at 628.
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that are factually justified.” 79 Ruiz does not justify withholding evidence of
innocence, rather simply evidence that can be used to impeach.80 Ruiz’s holding,
however, means that even if a defendant discovers the suppression of favorable
information that impeaches the government’s version of events, after a guilty
plea there is no recourse or remedy for the defendant and there will be no court
opinions regarding the prosecutor’s conduct.81 But Brady simply does not
protect defendants who plead guilty.82
One of the reasons that Brady violations persist is that prosecutors rarely
suffer consequences for withholding favorable information from the defense.83
Prosecutors have immunity for civil rights violation for withholding Brady
information.84 It is almost unheard of for prosecutors to go to jail85 or lose their
79. Id. at 631.
80. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do With It?,
23 ABA SEC. CRIM. JUS. (2008)
81. Id.
82. See Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years after
Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 407, 408 (2014).
83. See Gurwitch, supra note 75, at 309 (“The ongoing nature of this problem strongly
suggests that the current system for sanctioning Brady violations–only granting the defendant a
new trial when suppressed Brady evidence is discovered, and the defendant is able to meet Brady’s
materiality standard—is not effective.”); see Weisburd, supra note 43, at 146–47 (“In practice,
prosecutors often have little incentive to comply with Brady, and there are no external policing
mechanisms to determine whether a prosecutor has not complied with Brady.”).
84. See Gurwitch, supra note 75, at 314–15 (“The repeated reaffirmance of the Imbler rule of
absolute prosecutorial immunity is a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to sanctioning prosecutors
for Brady violations with financial penalties.”).
85. See, e.g., id. at 318–19
While state penal laws contemplate the prosecution of prosecutors who violate Brady,
they are so infrequently enforced that the possibility of prosecution barely warrants a
mention. One anomalous case is that of the prosecutor who, in 2006, handled the
prosecution of members of the Duke University lacrosse team on rape and kidnap
charges. The prosecutor committed various types of misconduct, including withholding
exculpatory DNA test results. Subsequent to being disbarred, the prosecutor was found
guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to a jail term of twenty-four hours. This case
was highly unusual, and was surely influenced by the national publicity it attracted, as
well as the resources of the defendants who were the victims of the prosecutorial
misconduct at issue. In more typical cases, the prosecution of attorneys who violate
Brady is nonexistent, thus rendering the deterrent value of the threat of prosecution to
nearly nothing.
Cadene A. Russell, When Justice Is Done: Expanding A Defendant’s Right to the Disclosure of
Exculpatory Evidence on the 51st Anniversary of Brady v. Maryland, 58 HOW. L.J. 237, 256 (2014)
(“In 2013, for the first time in five decades, a prosecutor would serve time in jail for wrongfully
convicting an innocent man. Remarkably, fifty-one years of prosecutorial misconduct in violation
of Brady has only seen this one instance where a prosecutor will be imprisoned for this wrongful
conduct.”); Mark Godsey, For the First Time Ever, a Prosecutor Will Go to Jail for Wrongfully
Convicting an Innocent Man, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/mark-godsey/for-the-first-time-ever-a_b_4221000.html; Balko, supra note 3:
[S]omeone could bring criminal charges against a misbehaving prosecutor. But this is
vanishingly rare. While there’s no authoritative count of the number of times it’s
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bar license.86 It is even rare for prosecutors to even be referred to bar counsel87
or mentioned by name in published opinions.88 It appears that prosecutor offices
rarely fire or demote prosecutors who violated defendants’ rights in this way.89
With more than ninety percent of cases resolved by plea90 and no obligation
to turn over impeachment information, and given that there is no appeal of guilty

happened, a 2011 Yale Law Journal article surveying the use of misconduct sanctions
found that the first such case to reach a verdict in the U.S. was in 1999. (The jury
acquitted.) More recently, the 2006 Duke lacrosse case resulted in criminal contempt
charges against Durham County District Attorney Mike Nifong. He was disbarred and
sentenced to a day in jail.
86. See, e.g., Gurwitch, supra note 75, at 317 (describing a study that “[f]ound just seven
cases where a prosecutor was referred to a disciplinary body due to a Brady violation” with the
following results: “Four of the seven referrals resulted in discipline: a private reprimand, a public
reprimand, a suspension of three months, and a suspension of six months.”);
Keenan, supra note 63, at 220.
Given the Supreme Court’s repeated endorsement of professional discipline as the
appropriate vehicle for addressing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, one might
suppose that state bar agencies frequently sanction prosecutors. In fact, prosecutors are
rarely held accountable for violating ethics rules. . . . [A] study by the Center for Public
Integrity found 2012 appellate cases between 1970 and 2003 in which prosecutorial
misconduct led to dismissals, sentence reductions, or reversals. Yet prosecutors faced
disciplinary action in only forty-four of those cases, and seven of these actions were
eventually dismissed.
Russell, supra note 87, at 257 (stating that an investigation by the newspaper USA Today into 201
cases involving misconduct of federal prosecutors found that only one prosecutor ‘was barred even
temporarily from practicing law for misconduct’).
87. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 10, at 415, 436–37 (“While the use of the state bar disciplinary
process is a viable option, numerous studies and reports have shown that prosecutors are generally
not referred for disciplinary action for Brady misconduct, and it is extremely rare that such a referral
results in professional discipline.”); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming:
Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1096 (2009)
(“[W]e cannot expect judges to begin referring more cases to bar disciplinary committees or to
castigate prosecutors by name in judicial opinions simply because legal scholars suggest that they
do so.”); CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 73 (Gerald Uelmen ed.,
2008) (discussing reluctance by judges to refer prosecutors for professional discipline for Brady
violations), http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf
88. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 89, at 1062 (“[M]any judges go to great lengths to redact
the names of misbehaving prosecutors from trial transcripts quoted in judicial opinions.”); Balko,
supra note 3 (“[T]hrowing out a conviction is intended to ensure due process for a given defendant
— not to punish a wayward prosecutor. Appellate court decisions that overturn convictions due to
prosecutorial misconduct rarely even mention the offending prosecutor by name.”); see also Green
I, supra note 74, at 2180 (“In most jurisdictions, disciplinary agencies keep their findings and files
confidential except when they issue public sanctions.”).
89. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 100 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting that the prosecutor sued in that case was “never disciplined or fired a single prosecutor for
violating Brady”).
90. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); Lindsey
Devers, supra note 77; Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics: 2003, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
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pleas, little opportunity to hear of exculpatory material post-trial, there are
simply fewer opportunities for prosecutors to get caught in withholding helpful
materials from the defense than in a system where more trials take place.
II. DOJ BRADY FAILURES
In their open letter, federal prosecutors Andrew Goldsmith and John F. Walsh
wrote that “Judge Kozinski proffered little support for the purported epidemic
of Brady violations.” 91 The prosecutors distinguished Brady violations where
there was a finding of deliberate misconduct and then wrote, “[t]wo cases over
fifteen years . . . is still two cases too many.” 92 Thus, the prosecutors are
suggesting that there were only two cases of deliberate Brady violations in over
fifteen years.
There are a variety of reasons why findings of deliberate misconduct are rarely
made. First, whether the Brady violation is purposeful or not is part of courts’
analysis in determining a Brady violation.93 When making such findings, judges
may want to protect young prosecutors.94 Second, some public defenders may
not want to accuse prosecutors of intentional Brady violation since defense
attorneys are repeat players and may have to face the same prosecutor again.95
Third, it is worth considering that in cases in which there is an acquittal, there is
no reason for parties to do a post-mortem on the case. No appellate lawyer will
look at the file if there is no conviction to appeal. Finally, litigation of Brady
violations often times takes place years after trial and purposeful violations of
Brady by prosecutors are difficult to prove without an admission on the part of
a prosecutor—a rare occurrence without a smoking gun.96
The distinction of purposeful as opposed to reckless Brady violations hardly
matters to the person who loses years of his life to prison. Any failure by the
top prosecutor’s office to disclose Brady material should be mourned and
STATISTICS 439 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/208756NCJRS.pdf (finding
97.1% of convictions in U.S. district courts in 2001 were due to guilty pleas).
91. Goldsmith & Walsh, supra note 13.
92. Id.
93. United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 1993) (factoring into the Brady
analysis whether the prosecutor had acted in bad faith); United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305,
1312 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that, when the defendant alleges the prosecution had used
false testimony, the court considers whether the prosecution knowingly used such testimony when
assessing a Brady claim).
94. See Gershowitz, supra note 89, at 1062 (“[T]here are entrenched reasons why judges are
reluctant to call prosecutors on the carpet. Many judges were former prosecutors, and there is a
general instinct for people to protect their own. Indeed, even among judges who were not
prosecutors, there is still a reluctance to chastise fellow lawyers.”).
95. Keenan, supra note 63, at 211.
96. See, e.g., Mara Leveritt, Prosecutors Have All the Power, ARK. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014),
https://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/prosecutors-have-all-the-power/Content?oid=3452595
(describing a case in which, even six years after the defendant’s conviction, a prosecutor refused to
turn over a tape containing exculpatory evidence until ordered to by a federal judge).
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studied so that it is not repeated. By focusing on purposeful Brady violations,
prosecutors again minimize the serious problem of non-disclosure of
exculpatory information by their office.
To consider whether the violations are as rare as claimed, this Article will
delve deep into the U.S. documented Brady record. Many more Brady violations
are likely given that only the ones brought to the attention of a court or a
defendant are the Brady violations that surface. Contrast that with the Superior
Court cases prosecuted by the United States Attorney’s Office in the District of
Columbia.
A. United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia
Overall the United States Attorney’s Office prosecutes tens of thousands of
cases every year.97 But very few go to trial.98 With dismissals, diversion
programs, and guilty pleas, the numbers of cases that make it to trial are tiny.99
Consider that in 2010 of the over 166,000 criminal cases referred by law
enforcement, only 3,056 went to trial in all of the federal district courts in the
entire country.100 Meanwhile in D.C. Superior Court, a single courthouse, the
United States Attorney’s Office reviewed almost 27,000 cases, 1,774 went to
trial.101 There were only fifteen trials in 2010 in United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.102 In 2013 only 4.29% of the total cases referred
actually went to trial in federal district court in the United States vs. 8.71% of
the total cases referred in D.C. Superior Court.103 The often-cited statistic of
ninety-seven percent of federal cases resolved by guilty plea only takes into
account convictions.104 Many cases are never brought, dismissed, or diverted
and do not result in any guilty finding, much less a conviction.105 Though just
over ninety percent of convictions in D.C. Superior Court in 2015 were via guilty
plea,106 forty-seven percent of defendants prosecuted by the United States
97. United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2015, U.S. DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE 2–4, https://www.justice.gov/usao/file/831856/download.
98. Id. at 5–7.
99. Id.
100. United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE
8–10, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/09/01/10statrpt.pdf.
101. Id. at 15–16.
102. Id. at 49. This appears to be consistent with other years. In 2013 there were fifteen jury
trials and one bench trial. United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2013,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUSTICE
51
(2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf. [hereinafter U.S.
Attorneys’ Statistical Report FY 2013].
103. See U.S. Attorneys’ Statistical Report FY 2013, supra note 102, at 14–15, 51.
104. Id. at 9.
105. Id.
106. Office of the United States Attorneys, United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report:
Fiscal
Year
2015,
U.S.
DEP’T.
OF
JUSTICE
65
(2015),
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Attorney’s Office who went to trial in the D.C. Superior Court were found not
guilty in 2013.107 In D.C. Superior Court, defendants are 3.2 times more likely
to go to trial than in federal court.108 Given that the same U.S. Attorney’s Office
that prosecutes in D.C. Superior Court also prosecutes in United States District
Court for District of Columbia, it is helpful to examine that office109 since no
U.S. Attorney’s Office tries more cases.110
Senator Ted Stevens was prosecuted and convicted in United States District
Court for the District of Columbia before Judge Emmett Sullivan in 2008.111
Because he was a United States Senator, he was prosecuted by the Public
Integrity Section of the DOJ as well as by Assistant United States Attorneys
from the Alaska office.112 After his conviction, it became clear that the
government had withheld exculpatory material from the defense.113 Troubled
by the allegations of misconduct, Judge Sullivan ordered an independent inquiry
into the conduct of the prosecutors while the DOJ launched its own
investigation.114 Judge Sullivan also vacated the convictions of the Senator.115
Attorney General Eric Holder later declared that he would not be retried.116

https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/annual/statistical-reports [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys’
Statistical Report FY 2015] (finding in 2015 1,920 felony convictions, 1,735 of which were from
guilty pleas).
107. See U.S. Attorneys’ Statistical Report FY 2013, supra note 102, at
15.
108. Id. at 14–15, 48 (stating that the D.C. Superior Court had disposed of 1,774 cases in that
year while there were still 554 cases pending in the District Court for the District of Columbia).
109. The author notes that she was a defense attorney in the District of Columbia and can attest
that there are many ethical, candid attorneys who work there.
110. See U.S. Attorneys’ Statistical Report FY 2013, supra note 102, at 14–15, 48 (looking at
the cases presented both in D.C. Superior Court and in the District Court for the District of
Columbia). The lack of the federal sentencing guidelines and fewer mandatory minimums make
Superior Court a less risk for a defendant to go to trial.
111. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-CR-231 EGS, 2009 WL 6525926, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 7,
2009); see generally Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice: The Justice Department Clearly
Wronged Senator Ted Stevens. Did It Also Wrong One of His Prosecutors?, THE NEW YORKER
(Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/03/casualties-of-justice (describing
DOJ’s misconduct in Senator Stevens’ case and the fates of the DOJ prosecutors).
112. See Toobin, supra note 111.
113. Stevens, 2009 WL 6525926, at *1; see The Ted Stevens Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2,
2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123863051723580701.
114. Stevens, 2009 WL 6525926, at *2.
115. Id. at *2 (“The verdict is hereby set aside and the indictment is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.”).
116. Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Moves to Void Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/us/politics/02stevens.html; see The Ted Stevens Scandal,
supra note 113 (“Attorney General Eric Holder . . . promised a ‘thorough’ probe into the conduct
of prosecutors, which is the least the Department owes Mr. Stevens.”).
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The case resulted in embarrassment for the DOJ. Newspapers all over the
country reported on the story.117 The high-profile status of the defendant, the
judge’s extraordinary steps in ordering an inquiry, the twin investigations into
the conduct of the lawyers,118 and later a suicide by one of the prosecutors119 and
finally the Senator’s death,120 no doubt, led to making the Senator Stevens case
a significant news story that remained in the press for years. Two years after the
prosecution, in a piece in the New Yorker, Jeffrey Toobin wrote that the
prosecution of Senator Stevens was “profoundly unjust” and said that “what is
indisputable is that the government did not play fair with Ted Stevens.”121
There were a number of things that were done wrong in the prosecution of
Senator Stevens. The government sent a witness subpoenaed by both the
defense and government was back home to Alaska.122 During trial, prosecutors
claimed the witness became ill.123 Post-trial, an F.B.I. agent alleged that the
government sent home the witness because the government discovered that he
was a poor witness after a mock examination of him.124 Although prosecutors,
particularly prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section, could have granted
open file discovery to the Stevens defense team, the prosecutors did not.125 They
also withheld information about their main witness—a cooperator—against
Senator Stevens.126 After a decision was made by the Attorney General to
dismiss the case, Judge Sullivan said in open court, “[i]n nearly twenty-five
years on the bench, I’ve never seen anything approaching the mishandling and
misconduct that I’ve seen in this case.” 127

117. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Moves to Void Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/us/politics/02stevens.html; Shelley Murphy, Top
Judge Wants US Prosecutor Disciplined: Says Evidence Was Withheld at Trial, BOSTON GLOBE
(July
3,
2007),
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/07/03/top_judge_wants_us_prosecutor_discipl
ined/.
118. Charlie Savage, Prosecutors Face Penalty in ‘08 Trial of a Senator, N.Y. TIMES (May
24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/us/politics/2-prosecutors-in-case-of-senator-tedstevens-are-suspended.html.
119. Charlie Savage, Stevens Case Prosecutor Kills Himself, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/us/politics/28stevens.html.
120. See Toobin, supra note 115.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Carrie Johnson & Del Quentin Wilber, Holder Asks Judge to Drop Case Against ExSenator,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
2,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/04/01/AR2009040100763.html (“The Justice Department asked U.S.
District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan to drop the case after learning that prosecutors had failed to turn
over notes that contradicted testimony from their key witness.”).
127. Transcript of Record at 3, United States v. Stevens, No. 08-CR-231 EGS, 2009 WL
6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009).
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Both the Judge Kozinski article in the Georgetown Law Journal128 and the
letter from the prosecutors addressed the Senator Stevens case. In his article,
Judge Kozinski applauds Judge Sullivan for holding the prosecutors to account
and condemns what he sees as DOJ’s self-congratulatory attempts at halfhearted reforms.129 In contrast, the prosecutors’ letter acknowledges that the
Stevens prosecution “involved significant discovery failures and deserves to be
held up as an object lesson to prosecutors,”130 but fails to recognize those failures
are of constitutional dimensions as Brady lapses. The letter continues that the
“Department’s efforts in the aftermath of that case also deserve discussion.”131
Those include discovery boot camp for new prosecutors and annual discovery
training for the experienced and a new position of “national criminal discovery
coordinator.”132
The Senator Stevens case was followed by fallout from what appears to be
another significant Brady problem by homicide prosecutors at the USAO—the
Chandra Levy case. Chandra Levy was a Washington D.C. intern who went
missing in July 2001.133 Her disappearance made national headlines when it was
revealed that she had been in a romantic relationship with a married
congressman, Gary Condit.134 About ten months later her body was discovered
in Rock Creek Park in Washington, DC.135 The case remained open for many
years until a man with no relationship with Ms. Levy was arrested in 2009 and
prosecuted largely on the strength of a government informant.136 There was no
DNA nor eyewitnesses to the offense, but in 2010 the man identified by the
informant was convicted.137
In 2013, lawyers138 for the man filed a motion for a new trial.139 A post-trial
Brady disclosure made to the trial judge while the appeal was pending cast
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Kozinski, supra note 11, at xxiii.
Id. at xxiii–iv.
Goldsmith & Walsh, supra note 13.
Id.
Id.
Scott Higham & Sylvia Moreno, Who Killed Chandra Levy?, WASH. POST SPECIAL
SERIES (July 13–27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/specials/chandra/.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Keith L. Alexander, Prosecutor in Retrial of Man Charged in Levy Murder Acknowledges
‘[M]istake’, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/prosecutor-in-retrial-of-man-charged-in-levy-murder-acknowledgesmistake/2015/11/20/ab31854c-8fbc-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html.
137. Id.
138. Disclosure: one of those lawyers, Jonathan W. Anderson, is the husband of this Article’s
author.
139. Keith L. Alexander & Clarence Williams, Defense Attorneys in Chandra Levy Murder
Case Seek Retrial Based on New Information About Witness, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/defense-attorneys-in-chandra-levy-murder-caseseek-retrial-based-on-new-information-about-witness/2013/01/11/3ebe1fea-5c09-11e2-88d0c4cf65c3ad15_story.html.
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significant doubt on the veracity of the government’s cooperating witness’s trial
testimony.140 The defense argued in their request for a new trial that the
information had been in the possession of the government since the 2010 trial
and that the government violated Brady.141 In May of 2015 prosecutors dropped
their long-standing opposition to a new trial on the eve of their attorneys having
to testify at the hearing on the motion.142 The timing of the government’s nonopposition to the new trial–a year and half after the request for a new trial and
the Friday before a long weekend143 that was to be followed by Tuesday morning
testimony by current and former Assistant United States Attorneys–made it seem
as if prosecutors were either trying to protect those lawyers or protect the
reputation of the office.144 In 2016, the government announced that it would no
longer seek to re-try the man accused and dismissed the case against him.145
Those two high-profile cases were not the only Brady scandals in the D.C.
legal community that involved the USAO. In 2012, a United States Attorney
admitted to withholding information from a criminal defendant back in 1985.146
Among the information withheld from the defense was that three witnesses saw
two men, who were never charged in the alley where the decedent was killed.147
Eight men, ages sixteen to twenty-one, were convicted of first degree murder.148
One of those men died in prison before this information was exposed.149
Brady violations have been a recurring problem in the District of Columbia
for years. In 2004, the Washington Post reported that another former Assistant
United States Attorney (AUSA) in the District of Columbia failed to disclose
that he gave to government witnesses sums of money that went beyond amounts
140. Id.
141. See Alexander, supra note 141.
142. Keith L. Alexander & Mary Pat Flaherty, New Trial Likely for Man Convicted of Killing
Intern
Chandra
Levy,
WASH.
POST
(May
22,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/new-trial-likely-for-man-convicted-of-killingintern-chandra-levy/2015/05/22/d5c5ac20-00c4-11e5-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Matthew Barakat, Reliance on Jailhouse Informant Dooms Chandra Levy Case, WASH.
POST (July 29, 2016), https://apnews.com/09d874ae2c7c47feb4060e8e02535c44/after-chargesdropped-mystery-levys-death-unresolved.
146. Keith L. Alexander, Ex-Prosecutor Admits Withholding Evidence Before Trial in ‘84
Killing, WASH. POST (May 3, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ex-prosecutor-admitswithholding-evidence-before-trial-in-84-killing/2012/05/03/gIQAXiHB0T_story.html (“[Former
AUSA] Goren acknowledged that he did not disclose that one of his key witnesses had lied to
authorities about a suspect’s whereabouts at the time of the killing before taking the stand in the
1985 trial” and that “he kept some information from defense attorneys for the men, six of whom
are still behind bars.”)
147. Id. (“Some of those three witnesses identified the two men by name. [Former AUSA]
Goren said he checked out those accounts but thought them incorrect, which is why he didn’t pass
that information to the defense.”).
148. Id. (“Eight men . . . [were] sentenced to “between [thirty-five years] and life in prison.”).
149. Id.
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necessary to compensate witnesses for the time spent preparing to testify.150
This failure to disclose deprived the defense of the ability to cross-examine on
this interest-bias.151 Although the United States Attorney’s Office knew of the
conduct by 1998, as a result of an investigation, the information was not made
public until five years later.152 As a result of the disclosures, three men were
released early from prison.153
Yet another federal prosecutor was taken to task in a published opinion by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 2015 for failing to disclose an
exculpatory statement by a witness in a case that went to trial in 2002.154 While
he was found to have violated ethical rules by intentionally withholding
information, he was ultimately not sanctioned.
In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Assistant
United States Attorneys that were handling a kidnapping case were scolded for
failing to turn over impeachment material.155
In 2011 the Washington Post reported that a Superior Court judge granted a
retrial and found that the prosecutor made “repeated, blatant Brady violations
and misrepresentations” that resulted in a young man being convicted in 2004
when he was just seventeen years old.156 After nearly seven years behind bars
the young man was acquitted in the retrial after the information was disclosed to
the defense.157 The then acting United States Attorney wrote in a statement that
much of the problems in the case centered on timing rather than a failure to
disclose.158 The Washington Post article then goes on to write about four other
cases between 2006-2009 of Brady violations where trial judges took action.159
In another case mentioned in the article, the trial judge found that the Assistant

150. Henri E. Cauvin, Misconduct Probe Cuts Sentences in D.C. Case, WASH. POST (Dec. 24,
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23453-2004Dec23.html.
151. See id. (“A number of people connected to the case received vouchers. . . And many of
the people who were paid were not even witnesses, the lawyers found.”).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Kline was originally sanctioned with a
thirty-day suspension from the practice of law, but that was appealed and Mr. Kline prevailed
because there was legitimate confusion regarding his obligations under DC’s Rules of Professional
Conduct. Id. at 215.
155. Jordan Weissmann, Prosecutors in Kidnapping Case Rebuked over Brady, THE BLT
(June 24, 2009), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/prosecutors-in-kidnapping-caserebuked-over-brady.html (“‘I have got to tell you Mr. Hegyi, I think the government is making
some poor decisions when it comes to turning material over,’ the judge said.”).
156. Keith L. Alexander, D.C. Judges Question Prosecutors’ Roles in Criminal Cases
Resulting
in
Mistrials,
Dismissals,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
16,
2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-judges-question-prosecutors-roles-in-criminal-casesresulting-in-mistrials-dismissals/2011/10/07/gIQAfFuypL_story.html.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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United States Attorney withheld the information “conscious, deliberately and as
a tactic.”160
Prosecutors withholding Brady do not always make the news, but Brady
problems rear their heads in run of the mill cases that get little attention. Since
2000,161 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has found Brady violations
in a significant number of cases.162 In others the Court of Appeals has taken
issue with timing of disclosures163 or the materiality of the information withheld
but still found (or assumed) exculpatory material was withheld.164 All in all
160. Id.
161. Given that the prosecutors who penned the open letter in response to Judge Kozinski’s
piece only looked back fifteen years, this Article is limited to Brady violations discovered since
2000.
162. See, e.g., Biles v. United States, 101 A.3d 1012, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reversing a
conviction because the government failed to disclose that the basis of the search of the defendant’s
backpack was a paid informant even though such information would have been critical to
suppressing the evidence in the backpack on Fourth Amendment grounds); Vaughn v. United
States, 93 A.3d 1237, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reversing the aggravated assault convictions of two
inmates after it was revealed that the government withheld a report suggesting that one of the
witnesses who identified the inmates had fabricated assault charges in the past to justify using
chemical agents on inmates); Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1097, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(holding the government failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence by not disclosing grand
jury testimony that eyewitness said that the shooter used his left hand when the defendant was righthanded); Lindsey v. United States, 911 A.2d 824, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding the government
repeatedly failed to completely disclose payments it made to witnesses, but affirming the
convictions because such information was not outcome-determinative);
Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that when the government failed
to provide even one potentially exculpatory witness to the material evidence brought against the
defendant that the governments obligations to the defendant pursuant to Brady were violated);
Sykes v. United States, 897 A.2d 769, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reversing when the Court found that
governments late disclosure of Brady information had a material effect on defendants ability to
defend himself); Bennett v. United States, 797 A.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the
government does have the obligation to disclose material evidence even if it adversely effects the
creditability of the government’s witness).
163. See, e.g., Zanders v. United States, 999 A.2d 149, 161–65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (criticizing
the prosecution for the late disclosure of evidence suggesting that another individual might have
had a motive to shoot and kill the victim in a homicide case, but holding the late disclosure did not
warrant a new trial because the defense had but failed to take advantage of several opportunities to
follow up on the report); see also Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 65–66 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(criticizing the prosecution for the late disclosure of grand jury testimony containing statements
that casted doubt whether an eyewitness actually witnessed the crime with which the defendant
was charged, but finding no Brady violation because the defense was able to elicit those statements
on cross-examination).
164. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363, 366–67 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing
how the trial court found a Brady violation when the prosecutor failed to disclose that an eyewitness
failed to identify the defendant as the shooter in an assault case and agreeing with the trial court’s
decision to continue rather than dismiss the case), vacated by 26 A.3d 233 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(affirming the defendant’s convictions because it considered there was harmless error in the
defendant’s case and also questioned whether the defense actually preserved the issue for appeal);
Odom v. United States, 930 A.2d 157, 159 (D.C. 2007) (affirming the trial’s court denial of
sanctions for the prosecution’s late disclosure of an eyewitness that alleged an individual other than
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there have been nine Brady violations found by the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals in reported decisions from 2000-2015.165 Looking at the D.C. Court
of Appeals shows that there are not simply two reported cases per year as was
suggested by the prosecutors over the course in the entire United States. Instead,
every other year, in a single jurisdiction, a prosecutor has violated Brady in a
way that made its way to the Court of Appeals.
Those published opinions only tell part of the story. In a letter supporting a
proposed Brady rule in the District, the Public Defender Service for the District
of Columbia cited to eight unpublished cases just in 2014–2015 where trial
courts found Brady violations or prosecutors dismissed or offered misdemeanor
pleas during the course of Brady litigation.166 That is eight different Brady
violations in a single courthouse over two years. With a Washington Post article
documenting five different cases between 2009-2011 with Brady violations
where trial judges took action, there are far more Brady violations than are
captured by published appellate decisions. With more trials taking place in D.C.
Superior Court than in federal district courts in the U.S., looking at the District
is a way to focus a microscope on the Brady problems of the Department of
Justice. Looking not just at published opinions, looking carefully at the datarich District of Columbia Superior Court shows that Brady violations take place
several times a year in a single office of the USAO. Brady violations are not
rare occurrences at all, but commonplace ones. So common, those prosecutors
have systems in place to hide and minimize them with dismissals and generous
plea offers so that their conduct is not questioned.
B. Other United States Attorneys’ Offices
It is not just that the United States Attorney’s Office in the District of
Columbia that has withheld Brady material. The United States Attorney’s Office
has made all manner of Brady violations since 2000 all over the country. The
following are examples of these failures.
There are Brady failures that come to light in the trial stage that would not be
captured by appellate reversals. In 2004 the DOJ asked a federal judge in Detroit
to vacate terrorism convictions against two men because of Brady violations.167
In Sacramento, California, the original conviction was vacated for a man

the defendant was responsible for the crimes with which the defendant was charged because the
defense still had three months to locate and talk with the eyewitness and three other witnesses
placed the defendant at the scene of the crimes).
165. See supra notes 168.
166. See generally THE PUBLIC SERVICE DEFENDER, REGARDING RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2010), http://www.pdsdc.org/docs/default-source/defaultdocument-library/pds-letter-to-judge-tallman-chair-judicial-conference-advisory-committee-onamending-rule-16d8d2f4c3c02264be8d48ff00007f1dad.pdf?sfvrsn=0.
167. Danny Hakim, U.S. Asks for Dismissal of Terrorism Convictions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1,
2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/01/us/us-asks-for-dismissal-of-terrorismconvictions.html.
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convicted of environmental terrorism where the United States Attorney’s Office
withheld information about the cooperator.168 A man in Indiana won a new trial
after an Assistant United States Attorney withheld information that another man
had admitted owning the firearm that the defendant had been convicted of
possessing.169 This information was discovered mid-trial.. In 2009 federal
prosecutors in Florida failed to turn over impeachment information from the
defense and the attorneys were publicly reprimanded.170 A federal trial judge in
the Western District of Virginia found that an Assistant United States Attorney
intentionally suppressed Brady to protect her “principal witness from damaging
and embarrassing cross-examination”.171 In his opinion, the judge wrote that the
failure to disclose Brady, “…was not an inadvertent oversight.”172 The trial
judge granted a new trial and removed the AUSA from the case.173 While the
full disclosure about the officer came on one week before the appellate brief was
due, the case was decided by the trial judge who gave the man a re-trial after the
Fourth Circuit remanded the case.174 Therefore, this serious finding against the
office would not be an appellate reversal that the United States Attorney would
count in its Brady statistics.
In one troubling case that made headlines, the Chief U.S. District Court Judge
for the District of Massachusetts Wolf asked the Massachusetts Board of Bar
overseers to look into disciplinary proceedings against a U.S. Attorney for
withholding evidence from the defense that the main witness in a mafia murder
case had tried to recant his story to authorities.175 In one instance Judge Wolf
wrote of federal prosecutors, “[c]ustomary means of addressing errors and
intentional misconduct had proved inadequate to prevent the repetition of
violations of constitutional duties. . . .” 176
These cases are all cases were the Brady violation was uncovered prior to trial
or in trial so there is not an appellate reversal. The violation was cured, so these
are cases would not have made ripples or made it to public opinions but for the

168. Colin Moynihan, Man Convicted of Environmental Terrorism is Freed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/us/man-convicted-of-environmental-terrorismwins-early-release.html.
169. Jill Disis & Jon Murray, Felon with Gun Will Get New Trial, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Dec.
20, 2013).
170. United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1322, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
171. United States v. Burns, No. 613-CR-22, 2016 WL 3910273, at *4, *7 (W.D. Va. July 14,
2016).
172. Id. at *7
173. Id. at *8.
174. Burns, 2016 WL 3910273, at *3.
175. Shelley Murphy, Top Judge Wants US Prosecutor Disciplined: Says Evidence Was
Withheld
at
Trial,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(July
3,
2007),
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/07/03/top_judge_wants_us_prosecutor_discipl
ined/.
176. Id.
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judges’ frustration with the government. But these type of failures show that
some federal prosecutors are withholding information until the last moment.
And there is no shortage of appellate reversals on Brady grounds either. The
First Circuit found a Brady violation in 2008 by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in
Puerto Rico for failing to turn over to the defense prior to trial a report that could
have been used to impeach a government witness.177
A 2012 decision by the Second Circuit found that the United States Attorney’s
Office failed to turn over portions of transcripts that undermined the
government’s main witness.178 That case was tried two times with lawyers from
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Attorney’s
Office—neither trial teams turned over the material. The Second Circuit called
the Brady violation “entirely preventable” and found that prosecutors “on
multiple occasions either actively decided not to disclose” the suppressed
material or “consciously avoided its responsibility to comply with Brady.”179
The Fourth Circuit documented “a troubling pattern by federal prosecutors of
withholding evidence from defendants” in North Carolina.180 Assistant United
States Attorney’s misconduct included “failing to turn over evidence that might
have been beneficial to a defendant in a firearms case” and “leaving the false
testimony of a witness uncorrected.”181 Prosecutors in South Carolina were
found to have violated Brady by failing to provide impeachment material in its
possession.182 The Fourth Circuit vacated convictions of two men as a result.183
The Sixth Circuit reversed convictions where the government failed to
disclose the exculpatory statements of the co-defendant.184 The court wrote that,
“nondisclosure of Brady material is still a perennial problem . . . “ and that “once
again . . . prosecutors substitute their own judgment of the defendants’ guilt for
that of the jury.” 185 The court of appeals seems exasperated with the prosecutors
and reflects a recognition that this is not a singular failing by one federal
prosecutors but a pervasive continuing issue.
This sentiment towards prosecutors is matched in some Ninth Circuit Brady
cases. In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of an

177. United States v. Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1, 18–22 (1st Cir. 2008).
178. Mahaffy v. United States, 693 F.3d 113, 119, 122 (2d Cir. 2012).
179. Id. at 122.
180. Id. at 133.
181. Id.
182. United States v. Parker, 790 F.3d 550, 558–63 (4th Cir. 2015). The Fourth Circuit
documented “a troubling pattern by federal prosecutors of withholding evidence from defendants”
in North Carolina. Anne Blythe, Court Scold U.S. Prosecutors-Appeals Court cites Discovery
Violation in N.C. District, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, (Aug. 27, 2013). Such conduct included
like “failing to turn over evidence that might have been beneficial to a defendant in a firearms case”
and “leaving the false testimony of a witness uncorrected.” Id.
183. Id.
184. United States v. Tavera 719 F.3d 705, 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2013).
185. Id. at 708.
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indictment and found that prosecutors in Nevada violated Brady and Giglio, and
made misrepresentations in court.186 Six hundred and fifty pages of documents
related to government witnesses’ prior records were not disclosed. The trial
judge found that the trial Assistant United States Attorney’s conduct was
“unconscionable” and that he “made affirmative misrepresentation[s] to the
court” and “acted flagrantly willfully, and in bad faith.” 187 In upholding the
dismissal, the Ninth Circuit wrote, we are “troubled, both by the AUSA’s actions
at trial and by the government’s lack of contrition on appeal.” 188
It is the ultimate sanction for a trial judge to dismiss a case on Brady
grounds.189 If a sanction is given for the violation it is often continuance of the
trial for the defense to catch up and make use of the suppressed information, or
perhaps an instruction that may make the defense whole.190 But a dismissal
reflects a fatigue with the usual excuses by the United States Attorney’s Office
or prejudice that cannot be cured. The fact that the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal shows that the Court of Appeals has tired as well.
But the 2004 dismissal by the trial court and the Ninth Circuit affirmance was
not a sufficient deterrent. In 2013, the Ninth Circuit found that U.S. Attorney’s
Office in Oregon “violated its obligations pursuant to Brady v. Maryland . . . by
withholding significant impeachment evidence relevant to a central government
witness.” 191 Prosecutors in Oregon found that the convictions they secured were
reversed when they failed to learn of exculpatory material about their main
witness.192 Judge Reinhardt wrote that “at the least the prosecutor failed in his
duty to learn” of the main witness’s prior convictions.193 This type of disregard
for due process by trial prosecutors is troubling.
But the most notable Ninth Circuit case is the one in which Judge Kozinski
wrote in the dissent, in which three other judges on the Ninth Circuit joined, that
there was an “epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land.” 194 Although no
convictions were reversed because there was “no reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been different” 195, the Ninth Circuit did find that the
favorable material was not turned over to the defense.196 In his dissent, Judge
186. United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).
187. Id. at 1084.
188. Id. at 1088.
189. Cf. United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A trial court
may dismiss an indictment on the ground of outrageous government conduct if the conduct amounts
to a due process violation” or under [the courts] ‘supervisory powers.’”).
190. Jones, supra note 10, at 441–47.
191. United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 892, 900–03 (9th Cir. 2013).
192. United States v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 903, 914 (9th Cir. 2009).
193. Id. at 911.
194. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
195. United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013).
196. See id. at 1181, 1187 (conceding that the contents of a report of an internal investigation
file
were “clearly” favorable to the defendant, but finding that the report was not material).
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Kozinski stated that this panel’s ruling “effectively announces that the
prosecution need not produce exculpatory or impeaching evidence” and that it
is a “signal to prosecutors that, when a case is close, it’s best to hide evidence
helpful to the defense. . . .” 197 The dissent goes on to say that the prosecutor
“stood before the district judge and uttered falsehoods” 198 and that “protecting
the constitutional right of the accused was just not very high on this prosecutors’
list of priorities.” 199The “prosecutor just did not take his constitutional duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence very seriously.”200 The dissent then cites to
twenty-nine Brady reversals, eight of which are federal prosecutions, as
evidence that “Brady violations have reached epidemic proportions.”201
The prosecutors who responded to Judge Kozinski want to focus on how few
instances of willful Brady violations can be proven in the published opinions—
just two of the eight over fifteen years. While the DOJ letter opposing the
proposed rule in the District Court in the District of Columbia say that they
average two Brady reversals a year. But by focusing only on appellate reversals,
we miss many other Brady violations. The cases discussed above where trial
judges take steps to remedy the violation—like the Stevens case—do not appear
in those statistics. The Brady findings that do not meet the reversible error
standard are not counted in the statistics.202 The dismissals are not captured in
those two per year statistics. The continuances that are granted for the defense
to investigate the late-disclosed Brady are not included in this two per year
statistic. The generous plea offers as a result of Brady violations are not counted.
The still-undisclosed Brady is not factored into the equation. Prosecutors
concentrating on willful violations also miss the mark. The inadvertent Brady
violations are the ones that could be addressed with the clarity of a rule and other
easy fixes that the DOJ opposes.
Certainly it is true that most federal prosecutors try their hardest not to violate
the dictates of Brady. While one might argue that a single rogue prosecutor
could get so convinced of a defendant’s guilt that it might cause him to hide
exculpatory evidence or that he may want to win at all costs to advance his career
and keep evidence that weakens his case from the defense, but it is not just
individual prosecutors who fail to disclose Brady material.203 The failures are
197. Olsen, 737 F.3d at 630 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 631.
199. Id. at 631–32.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 631–32.
202. See e.g., United States v. Calderon, 829 F.3d 84, 94 (1st Cir 2016) (finding that the
prosecution failed to disclose the arrest of a witness, but finding the error immaterial); see also
Olsen, 737 F.3d at 633 (arguing that the court’s refusal to vacate convictions when prosecutors
commit an “immaterial” Brady violation only encourages prosecutorial misconduct).
203. See Spencer S. Hsu, Convicted Defendants Left Uninformed of Forensic Flaws Found by
Justice
Dept.,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
6,
2016)
[hereinafter
“Hsu
I”],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/convicted-defendants-left-uninformed-of-forensicflaws-found-by-justice-dept/2012/04/16/gIQAWTcgMT_story.html. (“[W]hile many prosecutors
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systemic. In 2012, the Washington Post reported that the Justice Department
knew based on a review of its evidence that FBI hair analysis evidence was
flawed since 2004, but some defendants and their lawyers were not informed
until years later.204 FBI experts testified in cases all over the country. In 250 of
those cases, the DOJ determined that the flawed testimony was “critical” to the
conviction.205 While the DOJ notified prosecutors, the DOJ did not notify
defendants or their lawyers themselves.206 And while some prosecutors did
make immediate disclosures, prosecutors at the United States Attorney’s Office
did not notify defendants for years.207
Three men prosecuted by the United States Attorney’s Office were exonerated
between 2009-2012 after the flawed forensic hair testimony was uncovered.208
While prosecutors knew in 2004, these men spent additional years in prison
because of the United States Attorney’s inaction in this case.209 One man, Mr.
Tribble, spent twenty-eight years in prison after a forensic expert claimed that a
hair recovered belonged to him, though it was a dog hair.210 A now very
seriously ill Mr. Tribble won a $13.2 million judgment.211 This is the third multimillion dollar civil settlement as a result of the flawed testimony.212
The Project on Government Oversight found more than four hundred
instances of misconduct by the DOJ from 2002-2013.213 While the numbers

made swift and full disclosures, many others did so incompletely, years late or not at all. The effort
was stymied at times by lack of cooperation from some prosecutors and declining interest and
resources as time went on.”).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id.; see, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Santae Tribble Cleared in 1978 Murder Based on DNA
Hair
Test,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
14,
2012)
[hereinafter
“Hsu
II”],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-judge-exonerates-santae-tribble-of-1978murder-based-on-dna-hair-test/2012/12/14/da71ce00-d02c-11e1-b630-190a983a2e0d_story.html
(reporting on a case in which a man was convicted for murder on account of the faulty hair
evidence).
208. See Hsu II, supra note 217.
209. See Hsu I, supra note 213.
210. See Hsu II, supra note 217.
211. Spencer S. Hsu, Judge Orders D.C. to Pay 13.2 Million in Wrongful FBI Hair Conviction
Case,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
28,
2016)
[hereinafter
“Hsu
III”],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/judge-orders-dc-to-pay-132-million-inwrongful-fbi-hair-conviction-case/2016/02/28/da82e178-dcde-11e5-81ae7491b9b9e7df_story.html?utm_term=.c279a0679a8b.
212. Id.
213. Nick Schwellenbach et al., Hundreds of Justice Department Attorneys Violated
Professional Rules, Laws, or Ethical Standards, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2014/hundreds-of-justice-attorneys-violatedstandards.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/; see also Sidney Powell, Longtime Federal
Attorney: Eric Holder Protects Corrupt Prosecutors, OBSERVER (June 19, 2014),
http://observer.com/2014/06/longtime-federal-attorney-eric-holder-protects-corrupt-prosecutors/

350

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:2

came from the Federal Office of Professional Responsibility, names of the
problem attorneys were not provided.214 Of the misconduct, twenty-nine
instances were prosecutors failing to turn over exculpatory material.215
The numbers of Brady violations that we know of by the United States
Attorney’s Office is substantial. As mentioned earlier, there are likely many
others of which the public and defendants will never be aware. The DOJ and
the United States Attorney’s Office both clearly have the obligation to do better
than they have done. Ethical and Constitutional mandates are clear. Their
failures need to be owned by the office, studied and every effort to correct must
be made. Regrettably, it seems that the United States Attorney’s Office and the
DOJ have been more concerned with minimizing their mistakes.
III. SESSIONS’ BRADY RECORD
In 2017, a new era at the Justice Department began with Attorney General Jeff
Sessions. Jeff Sessions began his work as a prosecutor in 1975 for the Southern
District of Alabama and was the head of that office from 1981 to 1993.216 He
was elected as the Attorney General for the state of Alabama and served between
1994 and 1996 before he became a United States Senator the following year.217
Sessions has a controversial record. In his brief time, just two years, as
Attorney General of Alabama there were four Brady findings against his
office.218 Additionally, there were other allegations of Brady violations that the
defense was unable to prove to the Alabama Court of Appeals and the Eleventh
Circuit.219 The most noteworthy case Sessions handled is a case in which
(mentioning then-Attorney General Eric Holder’s refusal to release the names of DOJ lawyers who
had committed prosecutorial misconduct).
214. Schwellenbach et al., supra note 223, at 7.
215. Id. at 3.
216. U.S. Senate Historical Office, SESSIONS, Jefferson Beauregard, III (Jeff),
BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=S001141 [hereinafter SESSIONS]; Meet
the Attorney General, THE UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/ag/staffprofile/meet-attorney-general. As a U.S. Attorney, Sessions would have been responsible for many
things, including overseeing training of the lawyers in his office, discipline of lawyers who violated
office policy or act unethically in carrying out their job, and choosing which cases to bring. Adam
Serwer, Did Jeff Sessions Champion Desegregation?, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/which-schools-did-jeff-sessionsdesegregate/509867/. [hereinafter “Serwer I”]. His name appeared on pleadings and he was
ultimately responsible for those cases even if line assistants handled them. Id.
217. SESSIONS, supra note 216.
218. See e.g., USX Corp. v. TIECO, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 674, 675–77 (1999); Ex parte
Willingham, 695 So. 2d 148 (Ala. 1996); Shields v. State, 680 So. 2d 969 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996);
Hamilton v. State, 677 So. 2d 1254 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
219. See, e.g., Hays v. Alabama, 85 F.3d 1492, 1498–99 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding no Brady
violation was committed when the prosecution failed to disclose a witness’ certain inconsistent
statements because the witness had admitted on the stand that those statements were inconsistent);
Bell v. Haley, No. CIV.A. 95-T-913-N, 2001 WL 1772140, at *33, *111–12 (M.D.
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Sessions, while a U.S. Attorney, prosecuted black civil rights activists
attempting to help elderly black people vote.220 The three defendants were
acquitted in just three hours after a weeks-long trial.221 Some questioned the
motives of the USAO’s use of tremendous resources to prosecute black civil
rights activists so aggressively.222
Under Session’s tenure, Alabama’s Office of the Attorney General was found
to have committed several Brady violations. In 1995, the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Alabama in Hamilton v. State ordered a new trial because prosecutors
in Alabama failed to turn over proof that investigators had promised the principal
witness in a murder trial help with early release.223 In 1996, Shields v. Alabama,
the court reversed a defendant’s murder conviction because the government did
Ala. Dec. 5, 2001) (ordering an evidentiary hearing be held regarding potentially exculpatory
evidence before the court could rule on the defendant’s Brady claim); Williams v. State, 710 So.
2d 1276, 1296–97 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), aff’d sub nom. Ex parte Williams, 710 So. 2d 1350 (Ala.
1997) (finding no Brady violation was committed because the grand jury testimony withheld was
not favorable to the defendant); Arthur v. State, 711 So. 2d 1031, 1078–80 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996),
aff’d sub nom. Ex parte Arthur, 711 So. 2d 1097 (Ala. 1997) (finding no Brady violation was
committed when the prosecution failed to disclose grand jury testimony and prospective jurors’
arrest and voting records because the defense made no showing that would entitle the defense to
grand jury testimony and because the defense could have always asked the prospective jurors about
their arrest and voting records during voir dire); Carroll v. State, 701 So. 2d 47, 51 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996) (holding that the defense’s Brady claim was precluded from review because the trial
court failed to issue a ruling on whether the prosecution was required to disclose a witness’
potentially inconsistent statements); Lee v. State, 683 So. 2d 33, 38 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (finding
no Brady violation was committed because the defendant failed to allege that the prosecution
withheld favorable evidence from the defense); Magwood v. State, 689 So. 2d 959, 970 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996) (finding no Brady violation was committed because the alleged non-disclosed evidence
was in fact in the record); Gibson v. State, 677 So. 2d 236, 237 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (remanding
a case in which the trial court found exculpatory evidence but failed to inquire into whether the
evidence was material for Brady purposes); Smith v. State, 675 So. 2d 100, 102 (Ala. Crim. App.
1995) (holding the defendant failed to show a Brady violation because the prosecution did in fact
disclose the exculpatory evidence to the defense). As an AUSA, Sessions was also accused of
violating Brady for failing to disclose certain medical records, but the Eleventh Circuit ultimately
reversed and remanded the case based on Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998).
220. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, The Voter Fraud Case Jeff Sessions Lost and Can’t Escape,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/magazine/the-voter-fraudcase-jeff-sessions-lost-and-cant-escape.html (describing the case in question and containing
Sessions’ claim that his decision was “necessary and just”); Mary Troyan & Brian Lyman, Black
Belt Voter Fraud Case in Alabama Shaped Sen. Jeff Sessions’ Career, USA TODAY (Nov. 18,
2016),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/11/18/black-belt-voter-fraud-casealabama-shaped-sen-jeff-sessions-career/94088186/ (including statements that
insinuated or outright said that racism against blacks motivated Sessions’ actions in the case).
221. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, The Facts about the Voter Fraud Case that Sank Jeff Session’s Bid
for a Judgeship, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2016/11/28/the-facts-about-the-voter-fraud-case-that-sunk-jeff-sessionss-bid-for-ajudgeship/?utm_term=.8bf346ebede6.
222. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 233; Troyan, supra note 233.
223. Hamilton v. State, 677 So. 2d 1254, 1255–56, 1261 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995).
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not inform the defense that the victim had a prior assault conviction even though
the defendant was arguing self-defense.224 In 1997, the court reversed a
defendant’s rape conviction because the prosecution intentionally failed to call
as a witness a police officer on the scene who was told that that the victim denied
being raped and who would have corroborated another officer’s testimony that
the victim did not appear scared and was fully dressed and not disheveled.225
These reversals are all clear violations of Brady’s mandate to disclose
exculpatory evidence.
In the most famous Brady violation committed by Sessions, Alabama v. Tieco,
Inc., an Alabama Circuit Court judge said that Sessions’ actions “‘far surpassed
in extensiveness and measure in totality any prosecutorial misconduct ever
presented to or witnessed by th[e] court.’”226 Tieco arose because Sessions
pursued 222 criminal charges against TIECO, Inc., a competitor of U.S. Steel,
around the time U.S. Steel donated to Sessions’ senatorial campaign.227 During
the case, Sessions’ office repeatedly denied the existence of exculpatory
evidence, repeatedly refused to provide such evidence when requested, and
allowed many of the prosecution’s witnesses and its own employees to deceive
the court.228 Ultimately, the judge dismissed all charges because “the
prosecutorial misconduct [wa]s so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d]
the entire atmosphere of this prosecution and warrant[ed] a dismissal of these
cases.”229
Sessions’ responded that “[c]harges like ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ offend[ed
him].”230 Although Sessions neither offered contrition nor offered a defense to
the conduct of the office he said, “if prosecutors are continued to be abused by
defense lawyers, it can shill their willingness to take on high-profile, complex
cases.” 231 Sessions left to go to the Senate shortly after that case. No appeal of
the judge’s ruling was taken by the office.232

224. Shields v. State, 680 So. 2d 969, 970–73, 975 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).
225. In re Willingham, 695 So. 2d 148, 149, 152 (Ala. 1997).
226. USX Corp. v. TIECO, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 674, 680 (1999). The court referred to Sessions’
office because there were allegations that, during the criminal case, Sessions’ office was sharing
the evidence discovered with TIECO’s competitor U.S. Steel while U.S. Steel was suing TIECO.
Mark Oppenheimer, Jeff Sessions: An Attorney General Who Is All in for Prosecutors, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-oppenheimer-sessions-prosecutor20170105-story.html.
227. See Testimony of ACLU National Legal Director David Cole on the Nomination of Sen.
Sessions for Attorney General, ACLU (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/other/testimony-aclunational-legal-director-david-cole-nomination-sen-sessions-attorney-general [hereainafter Cole
Testimony] (transcript of hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee).
228. USX Corp., 189 F.R.D. at 674.
229. See Cole Testimony, supra note 227, at 7.
230. See Oppenheimer, supra note 248.
231. Id.
232. See Cole Testimony, supra note 227, at 8.
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While most prosecutors would be chastened by this type of dressing down by
a judge, Sessions did not offer contrition or even a defense or explanation.
Rather, he blamed defense counsel for exposing his office’s constitutional
violation. The lack of an appeal after such a public lashing suggests that other
lawyers in the office thought that they would have little chance on appeal of
justifying what took place.
While he was the head of the USAO, Jeff Sessions was nominated in 1986 by
then-President Ronald Reagan to become a federal district court judge.233
During his confirmation hearing, it came to light that Sessions used the word
“nigger.”234 He also made jokes about the Ku Klux Klan to a black lawyer in
his office.235 Sessions, then thirty-nine at the time of the hearing, conceded to
make those statements, but insisted he made them in jest.236 As a white man
who grew up in the segregated deep south in the 1950s and 60s,237 it is not hard
to believe that he may have harbored negative feelings towards African
Americans even as a prosecutor. As a result of these allegations of racism,
Sessions was not confirmed.238
Given those racially insensitive comments were made decades ago, they may
give only limited insight into Sessions’ current views on black people. On the
other hand, his being the head of the federal criminal justice system, which has
been criticized for its racism towards African Americans, is troubling.239
Someone who does not view black people as equal to whites may not be inclined
to treat them fairly in the adversarial criminal justice system.
While on the campaign trail for Trump in 2016, Sessions applauded Trump’s
1989 full page advertisement in the New York Times calling for the death
penalty for five African American teenagers accused of raping a jogger in

233. Ryan J. Reilly, Jeff Sessions Was Deemed Too Racist to Be A Federal Judge. He’ll Now
Be
Trump’s
Attorney
General.,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Nov.
20,
2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-attorney-general-jeff-sessions-racistremarks_us_582cd73ae4b099512f80c0c2.
234. Kyle Scott Clauss, Deval Patrick Urges Senate Committee to Reject Jeff Sessions,
BOSTON MAGAZINE (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2017/01/04/devalpatrick-jeff-sessions-letter/.
235. See, e.g., Adam Serwer, What Jeff Sessions’s Role in Prosecuting the Klan Reveals About
His
Civil-Rights
Record,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Jan.
9,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/sessions-kkk-case/512600/; Phillips, supra
note 252.
236. Reilly, supra note 255.
237. See Alisa Chang, Sen. Jeff Sessions: Loyal To Trump, Defined By Race And Immigration,
NPR (July 14, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/07/14/486011917/sen-jeff-sessions-loyal-totrump-defined-by-race-and-immigration.
238. See Phillips, supra note 252.
239. Inmate Race, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp. (indicating that while only twelve
percent of the U.S. population, African Americans make up thirty-seven percent of the inmates
under the supervision of the Federal Bureau of Prisons).
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Central Park.240 At the time that Sessions made those comments the five had
long been exonerated.241 Rape is not a capital offense.242 Nevertheless Sessions
celebrated Trump for the gesture of the ad and the tough stance against the
innocent young men.243 This position seems at odds with someone seeking
criminal justice reform.
In addition to examining Brady record and statements on race, looking into
his views on other criminal justice issues may offer some insight into what kind
of AG Sessions will be. Within days of assuming office, Sessions saw to it that
the DOJ’s policy towards a move away from private prisons was reversed.244
Housing federal criminal prisoners in private contract facilities as come under
fire over the years because of safety concerns and poor health outcomes for
people in those facilities.245 Some may see Sessions change back to private
prisons as a cost-savings measure, but his predecessor at that DOJ, Sally Yates,
found that private prisons do not save tax payers money.246 This move is one
that has been seen as illustrating a disregard for criminal defendants.247
The Sessions DOJ has indicated it would not pursue civil rights actions against
police departments.248 At a meeting of states attorneys, Sessions indicated that
the Civil Rights division of DOJ would “pull back” 249 on those remedies that
240. Gregory Krieg, Sessions: Case of Central Park 5, Later Exonerated, Shows Trump’s
Dedication
to
“Law
and
Order,”
CNN (Nov.
18,
2016,
8:38
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/18/politics/jeff-sessions-donald-trump-central-park-five-deathpenalty/index.html.
241. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413, opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 554 U.S.
945 (2008) (“We hold the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for [child rape not
resulting in death].”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“We have concluded that a
sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is
therefore forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.”).
242. See Krieg, supra note 262.
243. Id.
244. Eric Lichtblau, Justice Department Keeps for Profit Prisons, Scrapping an Obama Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/politics/justice-departmentprivate-prisons.html .
245. See id. (“[The] order had followed a report from the Justice Department inspector general
about safety and security concerns with the operations at private prisons, along with other issues.”).
246. Id.; see also Richard Oppel, Private Prisons Found to Offer Little in Savings, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/us/19prisons.html (reporting on a study that
found in some cases that it would cost $1,600 per year more to house an inmate in a private prison
than in a state prison).
247. See Marc Mauer, The Price of Private Prisons, USN (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/opinion/op-ed/articles/2017-02-24/jeff-sessions-is-unwise-to-expandprivate-prison-use. (“If the DOJ intends to continue, much less expand, the use of private prisons,
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel punishments requires the attorney general
to address these safety issues.”).
248. Pete Williams, AG Sessions Says DOJ to ‘Pull Back’ on Police Department Civil Rights
Suits, NBC NEWS (Feb. 28, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ag-sessions-saystrump-administration-pull-back-police-department-civil-n726826.
249. Id.
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address police violence against American citizens following the deaths of
unarmed young men in Ferguson, Mo and Baltimore, Md at the hands of
police.250 This move is seen by many as a policy change favoring police over
civilians, particularly ones entangled in the criminal justice system.251 While
the relationship between private prisons and civil rights policy and Brady policy
remains to be seen, these position changes certainly suggest that Brady reform
will not be at the top of the Attorney General’s to-do list.
Even despite the other items on his agenda given his history as someone who
has violated Brady without apology, Brady reform is not something Sessions
will concern himself.. Holder at least talked about training and educating young
prosecutors, it does not appear that the same will hold true for Sessions. If we
are to see Brady reform within the United States Attorney’s Office, it will have
to come from the bench, Congress, or litigation by defense attorney while
Sessions is the Attorney General. It does not appear we will see progress from
inside the DOJ.
IV. DOJ’S FIGHT AGAINST CHANGE
Even prior to the appointment of Jeff Sessions as Attorney General, the DOJ
has consistently resisted meaningful Brady reform. In the 2015 letter responding
to Judge Kozinski, the prosecutors called themselves “stewards of the public’s
trust” and “committed to fair play and honest dealings in every matter [they]
handle.”252 Nonetheless, the following year, the Lynch DOJ sent a letter
opposing a proposed rule that would regulate the dissemination of Brady
material by prosecutors, arguing the rule would “significantly expand the scope
of the government’s disclosure obligation and accelerate the timing of such
disclosures” at the cost of negatively impacting DOJ’s ability to protect
witnesses and increasing the costs of litigation, ultimately to address a rare
occurrence.253 Again citing the statistic stating that Brady violations are found

250. Id. (“Under the Obama Administration, the Justice Department opened 25 investigations
into police departments and sheriff’s offices and was enforcing 19 agreements at the end of 2016,
resolving civil rights lawsuits filed against police departments in Ferguson, Missouri; Baltimore,
New Orleans, Cleveland and 15 other cities.”); see, e.g., Ian Simpson, Justice for Freddie:
Hundreds Protest Death of Man After Arrest by Baltimore Police, HUFFINGTON POST (updated
Apr.
23,
2015),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/22/protests-freddie-graydea_n_7119938.html; Ferguson Unrest: From Shooting to Nationwide Protest, BBC (Aug. 10,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354.
251. See, e.g., Quentin Wilber & Kevin Rector, Civil Rights Groups Alarmed at Justice
Department’s Review of Local Police Settlements, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-justice-department-sessions-police-20170404-story.html.
252. Goldsmith & Walsh, supra note 13.
253. Letter from Andrew D. Goldsmith et al., Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. & Nat’l. Crim.
Discovery Coordinator, Off. of the Deputy Att’y Gen., to John Aldock, Chairman, Advisory Comm.
on Loc. Rules for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Mar. 30, 2016) [hereinafter
Goldsmith] (on file with author).
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“on average fewer than two reported federal cases each year . . . ,” 254 the letter
states that the “Department of Justice strongly urges the Court to reject the
proposal in its entirety.”255 There appears to be no recognition that two a year
is a significant number or that there are more than two Brady violations a year.
The violations missing from the figure just have not made it into a published
opinion.
The rule proposed in the District of Columbia would simply require
prosecutors to follow their ethical obligations, stating that the Brady obligation
begins at the “defendant’s initial appearance before the court.” 256 Noticeably,
the rule does not have a materiality standard.257 In many ways that is simpler–
prosecutors need not wrestle with whether information is material or not. The
proposed rule is straightforward.
In anticipation of the concerns that DOJ expressed in its letter, the proposed
rule contains a provision for witnesses’ safety or national security, or timesensitive law enforcement techniques.258 In those instances where there is a law
enforcement concern or a witness security issue, prosecutors “may apply to the
court for a modification” of the rule.259 There is nothing extreme or out of the
ordinary about the new rule that has been proposed. It is not as broad as the
Brady rule in federal court in Massachusetts.260 The District Court in the District
of Columbia would not be alone—over twenty-five District Courts have rules
regulating what prosecutors must disclose and more than a dozen have standing
orders.261 The ABA supports the proposed Brady rule.262

254. Id. at 2.
255. Id. at 3.
256. See United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Comment Letter on
Proposed
Disclosure
Rule
(Feb.
3,
2016),
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/DWLR%20version%20Actual%20Notice%20and%20Comment%
20for%20Brady%20Rule.pdf.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14; see Zoe Tillman, D.C. Judges Weigh Rule to Curb Prosecutor
Misconduct,
THE
NATIONAL
LAW
JOURNAL
(Feb.
3,
2016),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202748711837/DC-Judges-Weigh-Rule-to-CurbProsecutor-Misconduct?slreturn=20160516221225 (“Cynthia Jones, a professor at American
University Washington College of Law and a member of the committee, said the proposed rule was
not as broad as the Brady rule in the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts, which has some of the
most expansive language in the country.”);
261. Tillman, supra note 281.
262. Letter from Thomas M. Susman, Dir., Gov’t Aff. Off., to John Aldock, Chairman,
Advisory Comm. on Loc. Rules for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Mar. 15,
2016),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/2016_dcproposeddisclosurerul
e_l.authcheckdam.pdf.
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The DOJ response to this suggested rule was severe. In a seventeen-page
single-spaced letter the DOJ laid out its opposition.263. They called the rule –
proposed by two federal judges (among others) – “unwarranted and unwise.”264
They claimed that the rule will “upend decades of settled practice.”265 They say
“the proposed rule eliminates Brady’s ‘materiality’ requirement and seeks to
provide the defense with what might amount to open file discovery.”266 Though
later in the letter they state that their own internal regulations requires
“disclosure by prosecutors of information beyond which is ‘material’ to guilt. .
. .” 267 Nevertheless, the letter stated that the rule is “unnecessary to ensure a
constitutionally fair trial.”268 This is an extreme reaction to a rule particularly
from an agency that is supposed to ensure fair trials. The fact that the office
opposes this rule in the wake of the high-profile scandals and in a time when
much of the criminal justice system is being questioned is also evidence of the
extent to which the office seeks to avoid change. With Sessions at the helm, it
is unlikely that DOJ will reverse course in this regard.
This is not the first time the United States has opposed a rule regulating Brady.
The DOJ successfully fought a proposed federal rule several times. In 2004,
DOJ opposed an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (“Rule
16”)—the federal discovery rule—that would include a provision on exculpatory
material.269 Once again, in 2009, following the fallout from the Steven case,
prosecutors again opposed the expansion of Rule 16 to include Brady
material.270 While the DOJ has consistently maintained that a modification of
Rule 16 is unwarranted, this view is not shared with all the players in the criminal
justice system, as evidenced by a survey conducted in 2010 that found that ninety
percent of defense attorneys and fifty percent of federal judges supported a
change to the rule.271
The government has even fought access to information about how their office
decides when to disclose Brady material. The DOJ fought efforts to obtain
copies of their discovery practices, memorialized in the “blue book.” 272 One of
263. Goldsmith, supra note 253.
264. Id. at 17.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 4.
267. Id. at 6.
268. Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice (Criminal Division) to Hon. Susan C.
Bucklew, Chair, Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Rules 11 and 16 (April 26, 2004).
269. A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES,
www.uscourts.gov/file/17996/download (last visited Dec. 27, 2017).
270. Joe Palazzolo, Justice Department Opposes Expanded Brady Rule, MAIN JUST. (Oct. 15,
2009),
http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/10/15/justice-department-opposes-expanded-bradyrule/.
271. See Hooper et al., supra note 291, at 21.
272. DOJ PERSUADES PANEL AT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DC CIRCUIT TO KEEP ITS
FEDERAL CRIMINAL DISCOVERY BLUE BOOK FROM BEING DISCLOSED TO THE AMERICAN
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the reasons not to make the handbook public that the DOJ cited was that sharing
the information would divulge DOJ’s litigation strategies to the defense and
thereby “hamper the adversarial process.”273 When the National Association of
Defense and Legal Aid Lawyers attempted to get access to it, the DOJ
successfully kept the NACDL from getting access to the handbook.274
Eventually the newspaper USA Today was able to get copies through a
lawsuit.275
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Although no doubt there are prosecutors who purposefully hide material from
the defense to make their cases stronger to win convictions, there are also
prosecutors who simply find themselves in a culture that does not provide them
with appropriate guidance and support to do their job correctly.276 In addition,
prosecutors get entrenched in groupthink, tunnel vision, and other unconscious
biases that encourage prosecutors to try to win at all costs.277 Prosecutors asked
to imagine themselves as the defense and to determine how information might
be of use to a defendant will likely fail. Prosecutors can easily explain away or
erroneously minimize relevant evidence. Because of the lack of support for
Brady reform by the DOJ, real reform will have to come from the bench and
legislature and/or through litigation and pressure from criminal defense
attorneys.
A. Open File Discovery
The single easiest fix to the Brady problem would be for actual open file
discovery. Legal scholars have called for open file discovery over the years.278
PUBLIC; NACDL TO SEEK REHEARING EN BANC, https://www.nacdl.org/bluebook_july2016/ (last
visited Dec. 31, 2017).
273. Declaration of Andrew D. Goldsmith at 7, Nat. Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers v. Exec. Off.
for U.S. Att’ys and U.S. Dep’t of Just., 75 F. Supp. 3d 552 (D.D.C. 2014) (on file with author).
274. Brad Heath, Rules to Keep Federal Prosecutors in Line Revealed, USA TODAY (Mar. 30,
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/03/justice-department-discovery-policiesreleased/24239225/.
275. Id.
276. Andrew King-Ries & Beth Brennan, A Fall from Grace: United States v. W.R. Grace and
the Need for Criminal Discovery Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 313, 317–18 (2010),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1328&context=cjlpp (positing that
Brady violations arise in part because prosecutors, following their offices’ guidance, narrowly
interpret their Brady obligations while courts demand that prosecutors follow the spirit of Brady);
see also Ken White, Confessions of an Ex-Prosecutor, REASON (June 23, 2016),
http://reason.com/archives/2016/06/23/confessions-of-an-ex-prosecutor (describing the numerous
factors, e.g. the fear of failing to convict a potential repeat offender, colleagues’ shameless use of
bad-faith arguments, etc. that contribute to the occurrence of Brady violations).
277. Alafair Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision-making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1609–12 (2006).
278. See, e.g., Alkon, supra note 84, at 418; Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery
Reform: A Legislative Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 654 (2013) [hereinafter “Green II”];
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Open file discovery by its very nature means that generally prosecutors will not
withhold anything.279 Open files mean also that prosecutors do not have to make
the call about what is helpful to the defense. Rather, the defense can decide on
its own because the defense has access to all the information that the government
does about the alleged offense.
Open file discovery is not burdensome given that most evidence exists in an
electronic format.280 The state of Texas has implemented open file discovery,
albeit a somewhat limited form.281 Their open file law was put in place in
response after it was revealed that prosecutors withheld exculpatory information
that caused an innocent man to serve twenty-five years for a murder he did not
commit after DNA exonerated him.282 Open file discovery law was created to
take the decision to turn over exculpatory evidence out of the hands of
prosecutors and thereby reduce wrongful convictions.283
To the extent that open file raises concerns about witness security, appropriate
redactions or protective orders that limit with whom the information can be
shared can address those concerns. In certain instances when the protection of
a witness is an issue, the defense attorneys may not be given the witness’s name
or information may not be shared outside of the defense team. This exception
would alleviate any concerns about witness security.
The opposition to open file discovery seems to be largely to gain a tactical
advantage over the defense. With protective orders and redactions, there is no
other disadvantage to the government. An office that claims to “seek justice”284
should crave an even playing field between the prosecutor and defense
particularly after the high-profile lapses. However, the USAO and DOJ have
opposed open file rules for decades in many jurisdictions.285 With little chance
Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong:
The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 272 (2008).
279. Mosteller, supra note 298, at 275. But see Alkon, supra note 84, at 418–20 (describing
an amendment to Texas discovery rules that eliminates prosecutorial discretion over the disclosure
of exculpatory evidence, but requires the defense to file a motion for such evidence and does not
obligate the prosecution to inform the defense of information the prosecution learns about after the
defendant enters a guilty plea).
280. Alkon, supra note 84, at 418.
281. Id. at 419; see also supra note 302.
282. Id.; see Brandi Grisson, Inmates release Brings Call for New Evidence Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/us/inmates-release-brings-call-for-newevidence-law.html; see generally TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 39.14 (West 2017) (introduced
as the Michael Morton Act).
283. Alkon, supra note 84, at 419–20.
284. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (3d ed.
2009),
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pd
f.
285. See, e.g., Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., for U.S. Dep’t. of
Just. Prosecutors, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors
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for support for open file by the government, open file may be an untenable goal
without support from Congress.
B. Rules
While prosecutors continue to limit the defense access to information, court
rules that guides their conduct is the next best thing. Although a national federal
rule has been suggested in the past,286 it is certainly time for one now. With
stark evidence that withheld Brady material is a major cause of reversals in
criminal cases,287 as well as a leading cause of wrongful convictions,288 it is hard
to justify not implementing a rule. Such rule would help trial courts ensure the
fairness of their proceedings and court rules help achieve that goal and trial court
simply should not allow the government to burden our appellate courts. Fewer
innocent people in jail and fewer reversals in criminal convictions cannot be
something that prosecutors can legitimately oppose. Rules that regulate timing
and dispense with decisions about materiality by prosecutors should make
obligations much clearer to prosecutors. Rules that guide young and
inexperienced prosecutor should be welcomed by all. Defense attorneys can
also more adequately advise clients if they know when to expect disclosure of
Brady information.
But given that a national rule has been suggested and failed, local federal rules
are the next best thing in the interim. The United States Courts for the District
of Massachusetts has a rule289 that was also opposed by the DOJ.290 It followed
the 2009 mid-trial disclosure of Brady in federal court. Yet despite the
opposition by the USAO and the DOJ, the rule still was passed.291

Prosecutors should never describe the discovery being provided as ‘open file.’ Even if
the prosecutor intends to provide expansive discovery, it is always possible that
something will be inadvertently omitted from production and the prosecutor will then
have unintentionally misrepresented the scope of materials provided. Furthermore,
because the concept of the ‘file’ is imprecise, such a representation exposes the
prosecutor to broader disclosure requirements than intended or to sanction for failure to
disclose documents, e.g. agent notes or internal memos, that
the court may deem to have been part of the ‘file.’
Green II, supra note 301, at 640–41 (citations omitted).
286. Green II, supra note 301, at 667.
287. Id.
288. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 7.
289. MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14.
290. See Hooper et al., supra note 291, at 23 (“Although individual U.S. Attorney Offices
provided responses to other sections of the FJC survey, the DOJ provided one response for the
entire agency regarding potential amendments to Rule 16. DOJ reported that it opposes any type of
amendment to Rule 16.”).
291. See MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14.
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C. Orders
Judges who find themselves in jurisdictions without rules that regulate Brady
material should order prosecutors to turn over exculpatory material before trial.
After the Senator Stevens debacle, Judge Sullivan called on his “judicial
colleagues on every trial court everywhere . . . to consider entering an
exculpatory evidence order at the outset of every criminal case.” 292 Like a rule,
orders given in all criminal cases would set up expectations for the defense and
guides the conduct of the prosecutor.293 In addition, the judge could decide what
stage at which he enters the order, at the beginning of the case or at indictment
in order to balance the interests of both sides.
Such order is likely to yield different results than a young prosecutor simply
having a general notion from criminal procedure class that information that is
material to innocence should be turned over. The natural extension of orders in
specific cases is that when prosecutors willfully violate order, that they be held
in contempt. This penalty provides an additional deterrent for prosecutors to
commit Brady violations.
D. Punitive Jury Instructions
Judges should also consider punitive jury instructions in cases in which
prosecutors withhold Brady material.294 This type of instruction would inform
jurors of 1) the government’s Brady obligation, 2) the plain facts of the noncompliances, and 3) allow jurors to infer that the government’s withholding of
information means that the government believes that its case is weak.
The federal judge in United States v. W.R. Grace gave an instruction with the
first two components.295 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals sanctioned
such a practice and then after a petition for rehearing en banc, withdrew its
opinion.296 Additionally, legal scholars have called for such a remedy as a
sanction for intentional Brady violations.297 Punitive jury instructions are a
significant sanction but it is a less severe one than dismissal, which a number of

292. Transcript of Record at 8, United States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231, 2009 WL 6525926
(D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009).
293. Id.
294. See Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE
L.J. 1450, 1456 (2006) (proposing “that when suppressed favorable evidence comes to light during
or shortly before a trial, the trial court should consider instructing the jury on Brady law” and allow
“the defendant to argue that the government’s failure to disclose the evidence raises a reasonable
doubt about the defendant’s guilt.”); see also Armstrong, supra note 8 (describing a 1999 study
showing that of the 381 homicide reversals nationally, not a single prosecutors faced convictions
or disbarment).
295. United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197–98 (D. Mont. Apr. 9, 2009).
296. Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363 (2009), rhr’g granted and opinion vacated, 26
A.3d 216 (2011).
297. See Jones, supra note 10, at 447–48.
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jurisdictions have come to allow.298 Either sanction is likely to make prosecutors
think twice about failing to turn over evidence.
E. Referrals to Bar Counsel
Prosecutors suffer little to no consequences for their actions when they
withhold Brady. Few are prosecuted criminally despite violating laws.299
Prosecutors do not seem to lose their jobs when they withhold Brady.300 They
rarely seem to suffer any sanction, even professionally.301 Even the prosecutors
in the Senator Stevens case—one of the most reported Brady violations in recent
years—were shuffled around to different parts of the DOJ rather than
dismissed.302 Because prosecutors do not suffer professional consequences in
their own office when they violate the constitution, judges should make sure that
they do.
Prosecutors risk little personally when they withhold information and yet
stand to benefit professionally if they win a case, so a powerful incentive is at
play when they have information that is favorable to the defense, but about
which that the defense does not know. Legal commentators have observed that
if prosecutors were sanctioned more frequently, the instances of Brady
violations would decrease.303 More frequent sanctions would keep bad

298. Id. at 445–46.
299. But see Jordan Smith, Former DA Anderson Pleads Guilty to Withholding Evidence in
Morton Case, AUSTIN CHRON. (Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.austinchronicle.com/daily/news/201311-08/former-da-anderson-pleads-guilty-to-withholding-evidence-in-morton-case/ (reporting on
the guilty plea to criminal contempt of a Texas prosecutor who had withheld exculpatory evidence
for almost twenty-five years from a defendant in a murder case); Shaila Dewan, Duke Prosecutor
Jailed,
Students
Seek
Settlement,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
8,
2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/08/us/08duke.html (reporting on the sentence of a North
Carolina prosecutor who had lied about withholding DNA evidence from the defense in the Duke
Lacrosse rape case).
300. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 100 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[Harry Connick Sr., former District Attorney of the Parish of Orleans from 1973 to 2003,] never
disciplined or fired a single prosecutor for violating Brady.”).
301. See, e.g., Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline
Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 885–87
(2015) (describing the case of a celebrated Ohio prosecutor who was able to retire without
consequence despite withholding evidence in a capital murder case that strongly suggested that
another person with a motive to kill the victim was actually responsible for the murder);
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier et. al., Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55
WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1338 (2009) (describing the case of a New Mexico prosecutor who, despite
failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, ironically became the “chief counsel of the state’s lawyer
disciplinary board”).
302. Toobin, supra note 115.
303. See Keenan, supra note 63, at 245 (“Irrespective of the wisdom of the Court’s reasoning,
the ethics rules governing prosecutorial behavior need to be expanded and strengthened, and the
disciplinary procedures tasked with enforcing them reformed, if our legal system is to justifiably
rely on professional sanctions to deter prosecutorial misconduct.”).
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prosecutors from reoffending. Professional sanctions are a warning to other
prosecutors not emulate this practice.
However, judges rarely refer prosecutors to bar counsel for professional ethics
sanctions.304 They should. It is a clear violation of a prosecutor’s ethical
obligation to withhold favorable information from the defense. However,
referrals of federal prosecutors to bar counsel are rare and even more rare than
state prosecutors.305 If they risked the prospect of losing their bar license and
livelihood for withholding Brady material, it stands to reason that prosecutors
would be less likely to commit Brady violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
The DOJ has consistently rejected Brady reform for decades. It is unlikely
that the prospects will be any better with Jeff Sessions as Attorney General.
Sessions’ own record of unapologetic Brady violations and his stance on other
criminal justice issues make it clear that improvements that benefit criminal
defendants are not priorities for him.
The ideas for reform proposed above should be considered by legislators and
judges. Open file discovery would be the best way to curtail Brady violations.
All but the most conscious, intentional, egregious violations would be avoided
by allowing the defense access to the government’s files.
In the absence of open file discovery, the suggested rules and orders should
give guidance to young prosecutors who are not clear on their obligations. A
change in personnel, at least among the discovery coordinators within the DOJ,
would help prosecutors with the close calls on materiality.
In addition to guidance, deterrence is needed. Punitive jury instructions would
serve as a deterrent to the withholding of information. Knowing that one might
get a sanction mid-trial in the form of an instruction telling jurors that you have
1) violated the constitution and 2) you did it because your case was weak might
cause a prosecutor to turn over material long before the trial starts. Referrals to
bar counsel by judges when they find Brady violations would also be a powerful
deterrent. Prosecutors would likely not risk losing their livelihoods by violating
Brady.
The DOJ cannot continue to fight reform and yet maintain its prestige. The
reputation of the USAO suffered mightily because of the number of recent
304. Id. at 220 (describing a California study that found 707 instances of prosecutorial
misconduct between 1997 and 2009 and comparing it with a review of California disciplinary
actions that found that out of the 4741 cases warranting disciplinary action, only six involved
prosecutorial misconduct).; see also Balko, supra note 3 (“The Louisiana Supreme Court, which
must give final approval to any disciplinary action taken against a prosecutor in the state, didn’t
impose its first professional sanction on any prosecutor until 2005.”).
305. Compare Heath & McCoy, supra note 17 (“USA TODAY, drawing on state bar records,
identified only one federal prosecutor who was barred even temporarily from practicing law for
misconduct during the past 12 years.”) with Keenan, supra note 63, at 220.
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scandals–in The District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada,
California, Oregon. The failures of the DOJ have taken their toll on the
reputation of the Department in the legal community and in the public in general.
Federal trial judges and appellate judges have taken the office to task in very
public ways. Judges Kozinski, Sullivan, and Wolf have all publicly called for
the offices to institute reform. Continuing to fight progress cannot be said to be
in pursuit of fairness or justice. It is time for the DOJ to implement real change
and stop fighting efforts at reform. Ethics, justice, and fair play demand that the
USAO and the DOJ do better.

